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LAND AND COPYRIGHT 
STEWART E. STERK* 
ABSTRACT 
Increased use of the intellectual property label to describe copyright and 
related areas of law has spawned analogies to the protections afforded real 
property. These analogies ignore significant differences between the 
foundations that undergird real and intellectual property rights. In particular, 
real property rights operate to avoid breaches of the peace and tragedies of 
the commons—problems that do not arise with intellectual works—while 
copyright and other intellectual property rights are designed to provide an 
incentive to create, an incentive irrelevant when land is at issue. These 
disparities in justification caution against routine importation of real property 
concepts into copyright law. 
After exploring the weak correlation between justifications for rights in 
land and in works of authorship, the article explores how the disparate 
justifications should and do shape doctrine. In particular, the article suggests 
that differences in the duration of rights, in the scope of the right to exclude, 
and in the availability of injunctive relief can be explained by differences in 
justification for property rights. The article then turns to the interplay 
between copyright and contract, and suggests that here, too, the difference in 
foundation for real and intellectual property rights cautions against resort to 
easy analogies to resolve unique and difficult problems. 
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Although the “property” moniker is now firmly attached both to rights in 
land and rights in works of authorship,1 neither history nor logic required the 
 1. The historical origin of the term “intellectual property” is a matter of some controversy. Mark 
Lemley has traced the origins of the term “intellectual property” as a common descriptor of copyright, 
patent, and trademark law to the United Nations’ founding of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) in 1967. Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 
75 TEX. L. REV. 873, 895 n.123 (1997) (book review). Justin Hughes has observed, however, that the 
words “literary property” appear in eighteenth century state statutes, and that the Supreme Court used 
the phrase “literary property” in its famous 1918 decision in International News Service v. Associated 
Press, 248 U.S. 215, 233 (1918). Justin Hughes, Hurried Views of Digital Copyright (2005) (on file 
with author). 
 Even if conceptualization of copyright and patent as intellectual property is a recent phenomenon, 
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use of a common label to describe these disparate rights. From a historical 
perspective, copyright was in its infancy when Blackstone wrote that “[t]he 
law of real property . . . is now formed into a fine artificial system, full of 
unseen connexions and nice dependencies; and he that breaks one link of the 
chain, endangers the dissolution of the whole.”2 As a matter of logic, an 
identical set of copyright rules could have developed with tort labels rather 
than property labels. That is, copyright and patent infringement need not be 
treated as a species of theft or conversion, but could instead be treated as 
“business torts,” akin to unfair competition or trademark infringement.3 
The choice of label, however, is not without consequence. Property rules 
are imagined (not always accurately) to be rule-like, rigid and formal.4 Tort 
 
 
property analogies date from Sixth Century Ireland and the story of King Diarmed, who concluded that 
when a student copied his teacher’s psalm book, the teacher owned both the original and the copy, 
reasoning by analogy: “To every cow her calf, and accordingly to every book its copy.” Laurie 
Stearns, Comment, Copy Wrong: Plagiarism, Process, Property and the Law, 80 CAL. L. REV. 513, 
535 (1992). For further discussion of the Diarmed story, see ALAN J. LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 
2 (5th ed. 1979); Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 1541. 
And British booksellers used property analogies drawn from Locke to support passage of the Statute of 
Anne. See generally Dane S. Ciolino & Erin A. Donelon, Questioning Strict Liability in Copyright, 54 
RUTGERS L. REV. 351, 366 (2002); Mark Rose, Copyright and Its Metaphors, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1, 7–
8 (2002).  
 2. Perrin v. Blake, (1772) 96 Eng. Rep. 392 (K.B.). The Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 
(Eng.), England’s first copyright statute, was barely half a century old when Blackstone made his 
famous characterization of the law of real property. 
 3. Wendy Gordon has suggested that the common law of tort and restitution could 
accommodate the imposition of rights and duties to generate benefits akin to those provided by 
statutory intellectual property law. See generally Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, 
Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449 (1992); see also Wendy J. Gordon, 
Copyright As Tort Law’s Mirror Image: “Harms,” “Benefits,” and the Uses and Limits of Analogy, 34 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 533, 534–35 (2003). 
 Pamela Samuelson has noted that “[w]hat we now refer to as intellectual property law has long 
been part of unfair competition law.” Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus 
and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 
399 (1989). Adam Mossoff has noted that the first collection of rules and policies for American trade 
secret law appeared in the first Restatement of Torts, not the Restatement of Property. Adam Mossoff, 
What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 416 (2003). And a leading 
casebook concludes that “[t]he fundamental principles of trademark law have essentially been ones of 
tort . . . . [T]rademarks may not be thought of as analogous to ‘property rights’ at all.” ROBERT P. 
MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 559 (2d ed. 2000). 
 4. Blackstone, in both his judicial opinions and his commentaries, contributed significantly to 
the conception of property as rigid and rule-laden. In addition to his characterization of real property 
law as a “fine artificial system,” he wrote, in the Commentaries: 
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of 
mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and 
exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other 
individual in the universe. 
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (photo. reprint 1978) (1766). 
 Carol Rose has demonstrated that this vision of property as comprised of hard-edged rules is 
overstated, coexisting side-by-side with fuzzier doctrines that relieve parties from hardship caused by 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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doctrines are imbued with standard-like concepts of “reasonableness.”5 A 
person who appropriates another’s property is a “thief.”6 No comparable term 
of opprobrium attaches to a tortfeasor who interferes with prospective 
profits.7 One might surmise then, that introduction of the property label into 
copyright and patent was not accidental. Neil Netanel has suggested that 
supporters of expanded copyright and patent protections invoked property 
terminology to seize rhetorical advantages not otherwise available.8 
Moreover, general acceptance of the “intellectual property” label has 
spawned analogies to the protections afforded other forms of property—
particularly real property.9  
Reasoning by analogy is as dangerous as it is ubiquitous. Even within the 
domain of real property, disparities in circumstance caution against routine 
importation of doctrines from one area to another. Similarly, differences 
between the structure of patent and copyright limit the persuasive force of 
analogical reasoning. The differences, however, are compounded when one 
 
 
hard-edged rules. See generally Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 
577 (1988) [hereinafter Rose, Crystals and Mud]. Ultimately, Rose concludes that the distinction 
between crystals and mud is most critical at the level of rhetoric. Id. at 580, 610. See also Michael A. 
Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 52–82 (2004) 
(discussing doctrinal limits on absoluteness of property rights); Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property 
Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601 (1998); Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 
IOWA L. REV. 277, 280–84 (1998) (discussing gap between rhetoric of absolute property rights and 
practice of more limited rights). 
 5. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965): 
Where an act is one which a reasonable man would recognize as involving a risk of harm to 
another, the risk in unreasonable and the act is negligent if the risk is of such magnitude as to 
outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is 
done. 
 6. For invocation of the “theft” label in the copyright context, see, for example, Iowa State 
Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1980): “The fair use 
doctrine is not a license for corporate theft, empowering a court to ignore a copyright whenever it 
determines the underlying work contains material of possible public importance.” See generally 
Samuelson, supra note 3, at 399; Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and 
Social Values in Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 842, 847 (1993) [hereinafter Waldron, 
Authors to Copiers] (noting that typically, something more may be said on behalf of the would-be 
copier than the would-be burglar). 
 7. As Mark Lemley has put it, “The importance of the shift in rhetoric is clear here: 
‘infringement’ may be a morally neutral term, but ‘theft’ is clearly wrong, and courts are more likely 
to be inclined to punish the latter.” Lemley, supra note 1, at 896. 
 8. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File 
Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 22 (2003) (copyright industries employ private property rhetoric to 
support lobbying efforts and litigation). 
 9. To take an extreme example, a Canadian government report on copyright declared, 
“ownership is ownership is ownership. The copyright owner owns the intellectual works in the same 
sense as the landowner owns land.” Carys J. Craig, Locke, Labour and Limiting the Author’s Right: A 
Warning Against a Lockean Approach to Copyright Law, 28 QUEEN’S L.J. 1, 13 (2002) (quoting 
Canada, Sub-Committee on the Revision of Copyright, A Charter of Rights for Creators, at 9 (Ottawa: 
Standing Committee on Communications and Culture, 1985)). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss2/1
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seeks to translate real property doctrine into the world of intellectual 
property.  
Intellectual property rights rest on foundations considerably different 
from those that undergird real property rights. Unlike intellectual property 
rights, real property rights are in considerable measure designed to avoid 
breaches of the peace. Unlike real property rights, intellectual property rights 
are designed to provide an incentive to create. Real property rights operate to 
avoid the “tragedy of the commons”—a problem that does not arise with 
intellectual works—because once created, those works, unlike land, are non-
rivalrous public goods.10 
These disparities caution against routine importation of real property 
concepts and doctrines into the law of intellectual property.11 My objective 
here is not to ignore the commonalities between justifications for real and 
personal property rights, but to demonstrate that the disparities in justification 
have significant implications for the shape of intellectual property doctrine—
particularly copyright doctrine, which serves as the principal focus of this 
article. 
Part One canvasses the most common justifications for the institution of 
property and explains why most persuasive justifications for the institution of 
property do not translate into justifications for particular doctrinal rules. Part 
Two focuses on wealth-maximization, which does provide a framework for 
evaluating doctrinal rules, and demonstrates that the justifications for 
property rights in land correlate poorly with the justifications for property 
rights in works of intellectual creation. Part Three turns to doctrine. The part 
first demonstrates how, in several areas, disparities in doctrine track the 
disparities in justification. Finally, the part turns to an area in which current 
law remains uncertain—the interplay between copyright and contract—and 
demonstrates how the difference in the foundations for real and intellectual 
property can and should shape copyright doctrine. 
I. WHY PROPERTY?: JUSTIFYING THE INSTITUTION 
Why property? That question has engaged some of the world’s leading 
minds for centuries.12 Another question helps focus the inquiry: why not 
 10. Cf. Ciolino & Donelon, supra note 1, at 372 (arguing that, unlike tangible property, works of 
authorship are both non-excludible and non-exhaustible). 
 11. See Michael A. Carrier, supra note 4, at 5 (characterizing tendency to input property concepts 
into intellectual property law as “unfortunate” but “irreversible”). 
 12. Within the Anglo-American tradition, Locke, Hume, and Mill have all grappled with the 
question. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE bk. III, pt. II, § II (2d ed. 1978); JOHN 
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT bk. II, §§ 27–34 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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property? The most common answer to that question rests on the inequalities 
of wealth and power that inevitably result when persons enjoy the 
opportunity to accumulate property.13 Another answer focuses on the 
limitations on personal freedom that accompany any regime of property 
rights; creation of a right in one person leads to a correlative duty in 
another.14 
To overcome these objections to the institution of property, justifications 
have followed a variety of paths. One—to which I will return—emphasizes 
the efficiency gains generated by a property system. A second, traceable to 
John Locke, focuses on labor and desert.15 The thrust of the labor/desert 
argument is that property rights are required in justice as a return for efforts 
made by a laborer that have left no one else worse off.16 A third path, 
traceable to Hegel, treats property as a necessary component in the 
development of personality. By transforming abstract individuals into 
persons with distinct individual characteristics, property enables persons to 
relate to one another in ways that would otherwise be impossible.17 A fourth 
 
 
1963) (1690); JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY bk. II, ch. 1 (1894). 
 Property also plays a central role in the work of Hegel and Kant. See G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY 
OF RIGHT ¶ 40 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1967); IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW 61 (W. Hastie trans., Morrison & Gibb 1887). 
 13. Among the most famous opponents of property rights was Proudhon, who wrote: “[E]very 
argument which has been invented in behalf of property . . . always and of necessity leads to equality; 
that is, to the negation of property.” PIERRE J. PROUDHON, WHAT IS PROPERTY 39–40 (Benj. R. 
Tucker, trans., The Humbolt Publishing Co.). 
 14. See generally JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (Oxford Univ. Press 
1988) [hereinafter WALDRON, PRIVATE PROPERTY] (creation of property right in one person imposes 
obligations on everyone else; obligations which are often onerous). 
 15. Locke’s justifications for property rights include utilitarian elements as well as rights-based 
elements focused on labor and desert. Thus, Locke argued that if privatization of common resources 
required the unanimous consent, “man might have starved, notwithstanding the plenty God has given 
him.” LOCKE, supra note 12, § 28. See also WALDRON, PRIVATE PROPERTY, supra note 14, at 137 
(noting that Locke’s property theory has utilitarian strands); Richard Epstein, The Utilitarian 
Foundations of Natural Law, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 713, 733–34 (1989) (noting the utilitarian 
foundation of Locke’s property theory); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Lockean Arguments for Private 
Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 152 
(Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) (reading Locke to justify acquisition of land because land could not be 
used effectively without exclusive control). 
 16. See LAWRENCE BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS 36 (1977). For a critique of the notion that a 
laborer deserves the product of his labor, see WALDRON, PRIVATE PROPERTY, supra note 14, at 205 
(“That seems odd in a situation where the sole merit of his deserving action consists in the fact that it 
benefits himself!”). 
 17. Hegel noted that: 
A person by distinguishing himself from himself relates himself to another person, and it is only as 
owners that these two persons really exist for each other. Their implicit identity is realized through 
the transference of property from one to the other in conformity with a common will and without 
detriment to the rights of either. 
HEGEL, supra note 12, ¶ 40. See also Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss2/1
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path, advanced by Friedrich Hayek, treats private property as an essential 
pillar in the protection of political liberty.18  
Each of these last three justifications for property proves more successful 
as a foundation for the institution of property than as a justification for 
property rights in any particular category of asset.19 Consider first the 
argument for property as a protection of political liberty. For Hayek, “It is 
competition made possible by the dispersion of property that deprives the 
individual owners of particular things of all coercive powers.”20 When 
individuals and groups pursue different ends, the market—governed by 
abstract rules of conduct—produces a spontaneous order that permits people 
to “live together in peace and mutually benefitting each other without 
agreeing on the particular aims which they severally pursue.”21 Markets 
generate instability, reducing the potential for oppression by established 
groups. Property, in turn, serves as an essential foundation for the market.22 
Nevertheless, the content of property rules can vary considerably without 
undermining the market’s spontaneous order.23 Indeed, Hayek acknowledged 
that the presence of externalities weakens the case for strong property rights 
in land.24 
 
 
L.J. 287, 343 (1988) (“Hegel argues that recognizing an individual’s property rights is an act of 
recognizing the individual as a person.”); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Virgin Territory: Margaret Radin’s 
Imagery of Personal Property as the Inviolate Feminine Body, 79 MINN. L. REV. 55, 133–34 (1994). 
But see Edward J. McCaffery, Must We Have the Right to Waste?, in Munzer, supra note 15, at 81 
(concluding that property is not necessary for Hegel’s notion of personality). 
 18. For Hayek, “[i]t is competition made possible by the dispersion of property that deprives the 
individual owners of particular things of all coercive powers.” FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 141 (1960) [hereinafter HAYEK, CONSTITUTION]; see also John W. 
Chapman, Justice, Freedom, and Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII, at 293 (J. Roland Pennock & 
John W. Chapman eds., 1980) [hereinafter PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII] (concluding that for Hayek, “[a] 
competitive economy based on private property is the institutional guarantee of freedom.”). 
 19. Cf. BECKER, supra note 16, at 23 (distinguishing between general and specific justifications 
for property rights). 
 20. HAYEK, CONSTITUTION, supra note 18, at 141. See also id. at 124: “. . . [t]he whole system of 
separate enterprises, offering both employees and consumers sufficient alternatives to deprive each 
organization from exercising coercive power, presupposes private ownership and individual decision 
as to the use of resources.” 
 21. 2 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 109 (1976). 
 22. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1352 (1993): 
[P]rivate property, by insulating owners from expropriations by neighbors and state officials, 
provides an economic security that may embolden owners to risk thumbing their noses at the rest 
of the world. The private ownership of any valuable resource . . . can confer the economic 
independence that permits genuine political and social choice. 
 23. Of course, Hayek might have supported individual property rules, and in particular 
intellectual property rules, on market efficiency grounds, independent of their impact on political 
liberty. See Waldron, Authors to Copiers, supra note 6, at 855–56, 880 (associating Hayek with 
marginal productivity theory, while emphasizing Hayek’s caution that market rewards are unrelated to 
desert). 
 24. 3 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 43 (1976): 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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For Hegel, too, property’s significance did not depend on the form or 
content of property rules.25 In Hegel’s scheme, property enables the abstract 
person to develop individuating characteristics that enable her to engage in 
intersubjective relations.26 Hence, property is a necessary stage in the process 
of individual social development.27 For Hegel, however, personality theory 
dictates no particular form of property right.28 Indeed, Hegel did not believe 
that philosophy could provide answers to positive questions of law.29  
At first glance, the labor/desert theory might appear to justify property in 
a specific asset: the asset produced by dint of one’s labor. But virtually no 
asset of value can be produced by labor alone; labor must be combined with 
some combination of other scarce resources to produce something in which 
the laborer seeks “property.”30 The laborer who consumes scarce resources in 
creating a thing of value violates a fundamental premise of labor theory: the 
premise that the laborer’s appropriation leaves no one else worse off than 
before the appropriation.31 As a result, the laborer’s desert-based claim is at 
 
 
[O]wnership of a particular movable subject generally confers on the owner control over most of 
the beneficial or harmful effects of its use. But as soon as we turn from commodities in the narrow 
sense to land, this is true only to a limited degree. It is often impossible to confine the effects of 
what one does to one’s own land to this particular piece; and hence arise those ‘neighborhood 
effects’ which will not be taken into account so long as the owner has to consider only the effects 
on his property. 
See also id. at 109. On the other hand, Robert Ellickson has argued that “land remains a particularly 
potent safeguard of individual liberty” because “land can provide a physical haven to which a 
beleaguered individual can retreat.” Ellickson, supra note 22, at 1353. 
 25. See WALDRON, PRIVATE PROPERTY, supra note 14, at 129 (noting that Hegel is concerned 
with property not as a mechanism for deriving sustenance or enjoyment in an object, but “rather with a 
person’s moral or spiritual interest in being in control of or responsible for some external object 
connected essentially with his well-being.”). 
 26. See id. at 375–77; Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, The Appearance of Right and 
the Essence of Wrong: Metaphor and Metonymy in Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2481, 2495 (2003); 
Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1241 (1996). 
 27. WALDRON, PRIVATE PROPERTY, supra note 14, at 348. 
 28. Others, while acknowledging that Hegel himself says little about intellectual property rights 
beyond acknowledging the instrumentalist justification, have articulated personality-based 
justifications based loosely on Hegel. See Hughes, supra note 17, at 331–350, 338–39. 
 29. See Schroeder, supra note 17, at 131 n.287. 
 Indeed, with respect to the boundaries of plagiarism—an area today comprised within intellectual 
property—Hegel wrote that “[t]here is no precise principle of determination to answer these questions, 
and therefore they cannot be finally settled either in principle or by positive legislation.” HEGEL, supra 
note 12, ¶ 69. 
 30. Locke avoided this problem by assuming that labor is responsible for nine-tenths or ninety-
nine hundredths of the value of the products of the earth. LOCKE, supra note 12, § 40. That assumption 
can only be accurate if other resources are not scarce resources. Today, the assumption would hold 
only in relatively trivial circumstances—as, for instance, acquisition of a small rock collection. See 
BECKER, supra note 16, at 56. 
 31. Locke’s famous proviso requires that there be “enough, and as good left in common for 
others.” LOCKE, supra note 12, § 27. That condition can only be met in two circumstances: (1) when 
the resource appropriated by the laborer is not scarce (and therefore has no economic value) or (2) 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss2/1
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best a claim to value proportionate in some way to the benefits created by his 
efforts, not to any particular form of property.32 
Unlike labor/desert, personality, and political liberty theories, all of which 
provide justifications for the institution of property, but not for any particular 
rules, justifications based on wealth-maximization do operate at the “micro” 
level. That is, one can ask meaningfully whether a rule protecting individual 
ownership of land generates more wealth than a regime of free use, common 
ownership or state ownership.33 Similarly, one can ask whether a rule 
permitting an inventor or an author to control dissemination of her work 
(permanently or for a limited period) generates more wealth than a regime in 
which others are free to reproduce and disseminate the work as they see fit.34 
The answers to these questions may not be obvious, but the questions 
themselves are not incoherent. 
None of this suggests that wealth maximization can generate a full-blown 
set of optimal property rights. Social norms and customs inevitably influence 
any efficiency calculus.35 For instance, in a society where exclusion from a 
decisionmaking process is painful and parties can rapidly reach agreement on 
uses of land, communal ownership may have significant advantages over 
private ownership—advantages that disappear in a society that treats 
decisionmaking as a cost rather than a benefit.36 Nevertheless, wealth-
maximization can provide a society-specific framework for evaluating 
property rules, even if that framework is subject to contest at every point. The 
next section begins to develop that framework with respect to land and works 
of authorship—the objects that have recently evoked so many analogies. 
 
 
where the resource is scarce, but the laborer appropriates no more than his proportionate share of the 
resources available for appropriation.  
 The inability to meet Locke’s proviso is perhaps clearest in contemporary patent law, where an 
inventor who obtains a patent forecloses other inventors from using independently developed 
inventions. 
 32. Lawrence Becker explains that the labor desert argument “gives no unequivocal grounds for 
the private ownership of the things produced unless there is no substitute for it acceptable in terms of 
the goals of the labor.” BECKER, supra note 16, at 54. Becker notes that where production of things is a 
means to an end—security, power, etc.—and where the state can provide those things as the laborers’ 
deserts without granting ownership rights over the thing produced, labor theory does not justify private 
ownership of the particular thing. Id. 
 Jeremy Waldron advances a more direct attack on Lockean desert theory: if an individual’s 
personality is itself a cultural product, how can a person deserve property in himself and his 
intellectual work? See Waldron, Authors to Copiers, supra note 6, at 879–80. 
 33. See Munzer, supra note 15, at 218; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF 
JUSTICE 70–72 (1983). 
 34. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 471 (2003). 
 35. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy & Frank I. Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 711, 728–29 (1980). 
 36. Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 94 (1987). 
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II. LAND AND WORKS OF AUTHORSHIP AS OBJECTS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
A. Propertizing Resources: The Global Case and its Limits 
Property rights play an essential role in neoclassical economic theory. 
Without property rights, the signaling process so critical to an efficient 
market would break down.37 For this reason, neoclassical theory has 
generally assumed the existence of property rights.38 Recent property 
theorists, building on the work of Harold Demsetz,39 have examined more 
carefully the conditions under which property rights develop. Their work 
suggests caution about the global conclusion that greater propertization leads 
to greater efficiency.40 
Consider how Adam Smith’s invisible hand leads to efficient levels of 
production. Consumers, through their purchasing decisions, signal 
manufacturers to continue production until the marginal cost of production 
equals the price consumers are willing to pay. Once the cost of producing an 
additional widget exceeds the value of the widget (as measured by the price 
consumers are willing to pay), the widget maker has no incentive to produce 
additional widgets. Simultaneously, the price mechanism assures that 
widgets will be put to their highest and best use: prospective purchasers who 
attach less value to widgets than the marginal cost of production will not 
purchase widgets; those who attach more value will continue to purchase 
until the marginal value to them declines to the marginal cost of widget 
production.41 
 37. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights II: The Competition Between 
Private and Collective Ownership, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S653, S654 (2002) [hereinafter Demsetz, 
Theory of Property Rights II] (noting that “the price-determining market conditions that derive from 
the perfect-competition model, reflect private ownership institutional arrangements.”). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Demsetz’ pioneering article was Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 
AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967) [hereinafter Demsetz, Theory of Property Rights]. 
 40. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition 
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (emphasizing that too many overlapping 
property rights can inhibit efficient use of resources); Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution 
of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S421 (2002) (noting that property rights expansion and 
contraction might reflect transaction costs, or alternatively interest group pressure); Henry E. Smith, 
Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 
S453 (2002) (noting that governance mechanisms associated with common property rather than 
exclusion rules traditionally associated with private property sometimes lead to more efficient use). 
 41. See generally PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, MICROECONOMICS 402–03 
(1989) (discussing basic theorem of welfare economics, which holds that competitive markets will 
generate allocative efficiency). 
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Note that this process requires property rights in widgets.42 If consumers 
cannot own widgets—if all widgets are free for anyone to use—consumers 
will not pay manufacturers to make more widgets, even if consumers would 
prefer more widgets and fewer of some other goods or services. In addition, 
so long as widgets are free for all to use, those persons who seek to use them 
can ignore the possibility that others might place a higher value on widgets. 
Property rights in goods create incentives for manufacturers to produce 
goods purchasers want and incentives for purchasers to put those goods to 
value-maximizing uses.43 Of course, central planners could decide how many 
widgets manufacturers should make and how consumers should use them, 
but economists—bolstered by the experience of Soviet-style planned 
economies—almost universally believe that the “invisible hand” of the 
market is more likely to anticipate and satisfy consumer demand.44 This rosy 
picture might lead one to conclude that propertizing things of value always 
leads to efficiency gains; thus, much copyright literature starts with that 
assumption.45 But the thesis that propertization generates efficiency gains is 
subject to significant qualification. 
1. Qualifications from Within the Efficiency Paradigm 
Propertization is not costless. First, defining property rights can be 
costly.46 In a regime permitting free use of a particular resource, the need to 
draw boundaries between what is yours and what is mine disappears. Land 
lends itself to clear boundaries more than most resources,47 but propertization 
 42. See Demsetz, Theory of Property Rights II, supra note 37, at S654. 
 43. As Robert Ellickson has put it in the context of land, “Compared to group ownership, not to 
mention an open-access regime, private property tends best to equate the personal product of an 
individual’s small actions with the social product of those actions.” Ellickson, supra note 22, at 1327. 
 44. See WALDRON, PRIVATE PROPERTY, supra note 14, at 9 (“It is now accepted that a 
centralized command economy, in which all productive decisions were taken on the basis of central 
allocation of scarce resources, would lead, in the conditions of modern industry, to radically inefficient 
and perhaps catastrophic results.”); Demsetz, Theory of Property Rights II, supra note 37, at 5664 
(noting that “central planning depends on acquisition of knowledge about which goods are wanted in 
what quantities, but has no good method for enabling central planners to acquire that knowledge”).  
 45. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 34, at 475 (identifying as a basic proposition believed 
by most economists that “all valuable resources, including copyrightable works, should be 
owned. . . .”). 
 46. See YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 91–104 (2d ed. 1997) 
(cataloguing examples in which cost of defining and enforcing rights lead potential owners to leave 
rights unpropertized); see also Terry L. Anders & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study 
of the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163 (1975). 
 47. Cf. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The 
Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373, S415–16 (2002) 
(concluding that a “simple labeling system (for example, fences) is adequate to support division of 
property rights in land along physical boundaries. . . .”). 
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nevertheless requires extensive surveys,48 not to mention determinations 
about the scope of the right to exclude, transmit, and divide property rights. 
Definitional problems may be even more significant with other resources. If 
you write a novel, for example, how much of your work can I use without 
infringing your copyright? 
Second, even the most clearly defined property rights sometimes require 
enforcement.49 Property rights are of limited value if no consequences are 
ever visited upon a person who violates those rights.  
Third, although standard justifications of property rights emphasize 
property’s role in reducing transaction costs,50 propertization sometimes 
increases transaction costs.51 Property’s potential to increase transaction costs 
is especially great in those areas where a no-property regime would generate 
little potential for conflict. Consider, for instance, the traditional maxim 
“cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum” (to whomsoever the soil belongs, 
he owns also to the sky). Although traditionally used to resolve building 
encroachment cases,52 the maxim by its terms would apply to give a 
landowner the right to prevent airplane overflights. But such a result would 
create a transaction cost nightmare; airlines would need permission from 
countless landowners before putting a plane in the air. For that reason, courts 
have refused to extend the maxim to airplane overflights.53 
Moreover, the benefits associated with a regime of propertization depend 
on the nature of the market for the propertized good. When propertization 
facilitates creation of competitive markets, propertization tends to generate 
 48. Robert Ellickson has observed that “advances in surveying and fencing techniques may 
enhance the comparative efficiency” of property as an institution. Ellickson, supra note 22, at 1328–
29. 
 49. It is, of course, true that more clearly defined rights typically generate fewer enforcement 
costs than fuzzier rights. For example, Ellickson has noted that “[a] key advantage of individual land 
ownership is that detecting the presence of a trespasser is much less demanding than evaluating the 
conduct of a person who is privileged to be where he is. Monitoring boundary crossings is easier than 
monitoring the behavior of persons situated inside boundaries.” Id. at 1327–28. 
 50. See Demsetz, Theory of Property Rights, supra note 39, at 347–52 (noting that communal 
ownership of land generates large transaction costs that can be avoided if a single owner co-ordinates 
use of land). 
 51. See generally Levmore, supra note 40, at S424; see also id. at S434–35 (noting how private 
ownership of roads might lead to inefficient use if toll collection imposed high transaction costs). 
 52. See, e.g., Peters v. Archambault, 278 N.E.2d 729 (Mass. 1972). 
 53. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946), where Justice Douglas said of 
the maxim: “But that doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a public highway, as 
Congress has declared. Were that not true, every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to 
countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea.” See generally Thomas W. Merrill, 
Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 35–36 
(1985): Ellickson, supra note 22, at 1363–64; Saul Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path and Expanding 
Future, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 192 (2003). 
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efficient production and development of the propertized resource. But when 
propertization results in markets characterized by some degree of monopoly 
power, the efficiency advantages of propertization become more equivocal; 
imperfect markets are accompanied by deadweight losses that can equal or 
even exceed the efficiency gains generated by propertization.54 
Works of authorship furnish an example. In a world that does not 
recognize property rights in such works, one would expect (1) fewer works; 
and (2) underexploitation of some of those works, because investment in 
those works could be captured without cost by other potential exploiters.55 
Propertizing works of authorship cures those inefficiencies, but introduces a 
new one: if the holders of a property right in the work of authorship enjoy 
market power, they face a downward sloping demand curve, which induces 
them to restrict supply, generating deadweight losses. If, by contrast, the 
holder of a property right enjoys no market power, the potential for 
deadweight losses disappears.56  
2. Qualifications from Outside the Efficiency Paradigm 
Much property scholarship assumes that the impact of a propertization 
regime can be reduced to quantifiable costs and benefits. The assumption, 
however, is not universal. Neil Netanel, for instance, contends that economic 
approaches to copyright “threaten to diminish” copyright’s “central role in 
promoting public education and expressive diversity.”57 For Netanel, 
copyright’s purpose is “to underwrite political competency,” leaving 
“allocational efficiency as a secondary consideration.”58 Netanel argues that 
the state should define entitlements in a way that “augments citizens’ 
capacity for independent-minded participation in public discourse.”59 A 
property right in works of authorship becomes important because “a strong 
self-reliant expressive sector whose roots are outside the state . . . constitutes 
an indispensable ingredient of representative democracy.”60 At the same 
 54. Saul Levmore warns that when the efficiency case for property protection is equivocal, 
interest group pressures tend to expand property protection, in part because there is no clear efficiency 
case to rebut their propertization claims. Levmore, supra note 53, at 192–93. 
 55. See infra text accompanying notes 90–92. 
 56. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 41 at 236–38 (discussing losses resulting from 
monopoly power); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION 
AND ITS PRACTICE, § 2.3(c), at 75 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing deadweight losses created by exclusive 
rights). 
 57. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 341 
(1996). 
 58. Id. at 364. 
 59. Id. at 346. 
 60. Id. at 360. 
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time, excessively broad copyright protection “would stifle expressive 
diversity and undermine copyright’s potential for furthering citizen 
participation in democratic self-rule.”61 Hence, property in creative works 
should be defined to further copyright’s democratic purpose, not to maximize 
wealth.62 As Netanel puts it, “The activities and transactions that copyright 
encourages are in, but not of, the market.”63 
One might recast Netanel’s arguments in economic terms by treating 
improved public discourse, and the consequent increase in the effectiveness 
of democratic government, as benefits that an owner of information cannot 
internalize. The argument is not peculiar to works of authorship. Carol Rose 
has developed a similar argument to explain the need for public, as opposed 
to private, roads: commerce, facilitated by public roads, contributes to the 
“political synergies of democratic self-governance.”64 In both cases, the 
argument is that complete propertization would result in too little interchange 
of ideas and discourse. 
The argument remains subject to debate. Polk Wagner, for instance, has 
argued that increased propertization of information will expand the 
intellectual commons rather than diminish it.65 He emphasizes that even in a 
regime that accords owners of information broad rights over works of 
authorship, it will be virtually impossible to control derivative information 
associated indirectly with the creation of core information.66 As a result, if 
the incentives generated by propertization work as theorized, the result will 
be increased availability of derivative information.67 In essence, Wagner 
focuses on the external benefits associated with propertization, while Netanel 
focuses on external costs.  
Whether external benefits or external costs predominate may be an 
empirical question that depends on the nature of the resource at issue. But the 
empirical nature of the question undermines the case for global propertization 
of resources, and it simultaneously undermines the case for analogizing 
 61. Id. at 364. 
 62. Id. As Netanel puts it, law should not “treat creative expression as simply another 
commodity. . . .” Id.  
 63. Id.  
 64. Carol M. Rose, The Public Domain: Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of 
Public Property in the Information Age, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 98 (2003) [hereinafter Rose, 
Roads]. Rose notes that public squares and other places for public speech and political communication 
are subject to similar public claims on tangible property. Id. 
 65. R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of 
Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1002 (2003). 
 66. Id. at 1010–16 (cataloguing obstacles to control of derivative information, including 
enforcement costs, market pressures, and technological limitations). 
 67. See id. at 1010. 
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between land and works of authorship. If the case for propertization of 
valuable resources were a global one, analogies between real property and 
intellectual property would generally be unproblematic. But once it becomes 
apparent that the case for propertization is context-specific, analogies require 
more careful scrutiny. In particular, any evaluation of the strength of the 
analogy requires careful consideration of the supposed benefits associated 
with propertizing the particular resource68—the subject of the next several 
sections. 
B. Property as a Protection Against Breach of the Peace 
At least since Aristotle, legal thinkers have justified property as a 
mechanism for avoiding quarrels and settling conflicts.69 Even the most 
libertarian of theorists acknowledge that the state must play a critical role in 
preventing feuds and controlling violence.70 When land is involved, the 
potential for quarrels is particularly significant. As a New Jersey court put it, 
“Two men cannot plow the same furrow.”71 Legal rules—property law 
rules—allocate rights in land, reducing the potential for conflict among 
potential users of land. 
Land need not be divided into privately-owned discrete parcels to reduce 
the potential for quarrels. State ownership or common ownership would 
suffice, so long as clearly demarcated rules allocate each scarce use right to a 
particular person or group or provide a mechanism for resolving disputes 
 68. Thomas Merrill has identified in the work of Demsetz three distinct benefits of 
propertization, each of which Demsetz presents in the language of externalities. Thomas W. Merrill, 
The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S331, S331–32 (2002). 
Other than property’s role as a means of reducing transaction costs, Merrill focuses on property as an 
institution for optimal development of resources (see infra section II.C), and as an institution for 
reducing the rent dissipation associated with open access regimes (see infra section D). Id.  
 69. THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE, § 1263(a), (b) (Ernest Barker trans., 1946): “When everyone 
has his own separate sphere of interest, there will not be the same ground for quarrels; and the amount 
of interest will increase, because each man will feel that he is applying himself to what is his own.” Id. 
See also SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE LAWS OF NATURE bk. IV, ch. iv, § 5, at 322; see also Charles 
Donahue, Jr., The Future of the Concept of Property Predicted from its Past, in PROPERTY: NOMOS 
XXII, supra note 18, at 45 (tracing Western property’s origin as a dispute-resolution mechanism, but 
indicating that use of property as a dispute resolution mechanism might have been “an accident of 
chronology.”). 
 70. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 11 (1974). Thus, Robert Nozick 
describes the state of nature as one in which “private and personal enforcement of one’s rights . . . 
leads to feuds, to an endless series of acts of retaliation and exactions of compensation. And there is no 
firm way to settle such a dispute, to end it and to have both parties know it is ended.” Id. Nozick then 
demonstrates how the need to secure protection services leads to development of the “minimal state.” 
Id. at 26–28, 51–53, 118–20.  
 71. Mastbaum v. Mastbaum, 9 A.2d 51, 55 (N.J. Ch. 1939). 
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over use rights.72 Those rules need not derive from positive law; custom 
might suffice to prevent conflict.73 What is critical, however, is some 
mechanism for assuring that only one person plows each furrow.74 A 
common ownership regime that permitted each individual to make “free use” 
of land would inevitably generate conflict among potential users.75 
By contrast, for resources that are not scarce property rights are not 
necessary to promote conflict avoidance or conflict resolution. So long as a 
potential user can find as much as he can use of a resource, why expend 
energy fighting with other potential users? “Free use” regimes have 
flourished, for instance, with respect to water—at least in those areas where 
water has been plentiful.76  
Property rights are similarly unnecessary to prevent conflicts with respect 
to man-made non-rival goods. Consider, for instance, the beacon of a 
lighthouse. Use of the beacon by one boat does not diminish the beacon’s 
value to other boats. As a result, a “free use” regime is unlikely to generate 
conflicts among boats. The same is true with respect to roads (at least until 
congestion leads to “road rage”); use of a road by one traveler does not 
diminish the road’s value for other travelers, reducing the occasion for 
conflict.77  
Building lighthouses and roads requires an expenditure of resources. 
Property rules might be helpful in assuring that appropriate resources are 
devoted to creating these non-rival goods.78 For present purposes, however, 
the critical point is that property rules are not necessary to prevent conflict 
over the use of these resources; two men cannot plow the same furrow, but 
two boats can be guided by the same beacon, and two travelers can take the 
same road. 
 72. Cf. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property 
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S454–55 (2002) (contrasting exclusion (private property) with 
governance (common property) as strategies for resource allocation). 
 73. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991). 
 74. As Henry Smith has noted, that assurance can be provided either by a private property regime 
that focuses on exclusion rights or on a common property regime that incorporates a set of governance 
rules. See generally Smith, supra note 72. 
 75. See Ellickson, supra note 22, at 1328 (discussing increased policing difficulties generated by 
common ownership). 
 76. See generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation in the Southeastern States 
at the Opening of the Twenty-First Century, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 9 (2002). 
 77. Carol Rose has argued that low levels of congestibility cannot be the only reason for 
permitting free use of roads; she emphasizes the network effects that make roads more valuable as 
more people use them. Rose, Roads, supra note 64, at 97–99. 
 78. For instance, government might permit creation of private toll roads and then permit the toll 
road operators to charge tolls reflecting their expenses. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: 
Custom, Commerce, an Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 752 (1986). 
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Works of intellectual creation—inventions, books, songs, computer 
programs—are non-rival goods in the same sense as lighthouses and roads.79 
Once intellectual works are created, use by multiple persons does not 
diminish their value to other users.80 Indeed, network effects may make them 
more valuable if they are used widely. As a result, there is little potential for 
conflict among users, and property rights are not necessary to avoid such 
conflicts.81 
Of course, failure to propertize works of authorship might spur 
violence—perhaps in the form of technological warfare—by creators against 
users who fail to pay for the works that they use.82 Conversely, propertization 
could spur warfare by users against creators who limit access to their non-
rival works. Failure to propertize and propertization present reciprocal risks 
of violence by the parties disadvantaged by the chosen legal regime. There is 
no a priori basis for assuming that a regime marked by propertization will 
generate fewer (or more) breaches of the peace than a regime that does not 
propertize works of authorship. Instead, the incidence of violence will 
depend on the relative power of the competing interest groups and on 
whether those disadvantaged by the applicable rule can accept the fairness of 
the rule. 
Avoidance of conflict, then, provides no systematic justification for 
propertizing works of authorship, in marked contrast to the situation with 
land where the rival nature of the resource makes propertization a useful tool 
for avoiding breaches of the peace.  
C. Property Rights as Incentives to Create 
As we have seen, recognizing property rights in widgets generally leads 
to marginal cost pricing of widgets, which, in turn, leads to an efficient level 
of widget production. Marginal cost pricing, however, leads to 
underproduction of public goods—those that can be enjoyed by additional 
consumers at no marginal cost.83 Works of intellectual creation typically fall 
 79. Intellectual works are nonrivalrous public goods in the sense that they cannot be depleted by 
overuse. Wagner, supra note 65, at 1001; see also James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic 
Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2015 
(2000). 
 80. Id. at 2012 (summarizing economic analysis of information as a public good). 
 81. See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 288–89 (1970) (noting that property 
rights in works of intellectual creation are not needed to prevent congestion or strife). 
 82. See generally Douglas Lichtman, How the Law Responds to Self-Help (John M. Olin Law & 
Econ. Working Paper No. 232, 2d Series, 2004) (discussing potential for self-help in copyright law). 
 83. National defense and lighthouses are classic examples. See Mark Lemley, The Economics of 
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into this category. Once an author writes a book, or a producer makes a 
movie, the marginal cost of making the book or movie available to 
consumers is near zero. Marginal cost pricing, then, would lead to a price of 
zero, which would yield the author or producer no return on effort expended 
in creating the work.84 Ultimately, the result will be underproduction of 
books, movies, and other works of intellectual creation.85 
Intellectual property rights address this danger of underproduction. By 
giving the author an exclusive right to reproduce her work, copyright 
eliminates the potential that competitors will offer the author’s work at the 
marginal cost of reproduction.86 Once relieved of competition by potential 
copyists, some authors—like monopolists—face downward-sloping demand 
curves.87 As a result, the author will produce copies only until marginal 
revenue (not price) equals marginal cost, allowing the author to recover some 
of the costs incurred in developing her work. In other words, just as property 
rights create an incentive for manufacturers to make the optimal number of 
widgets, intellectual property rights create an incentive for authors (and 
inventors) to create (very roughly) the optimal number of writings and 
inventions.88 
Whatever merit the incentive justification has for intellectual property 
rights—and, for that matter, for property rights in widgets—the justification 
is not applicable to property rights in land. Because land is fixed in quantity, 
no set of incentives will result in creation of more.  
 
 
Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 995 (1997) [hereinafter Lemley, 
Economics of Improvement]. 
 84. See Netanel, supra note 57, at 292. 
 85. Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 83, at 995. 
 86. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: Implications for 
Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367, 1370–72 (1998). 
 87. Intellectual property rights do not transform all authors into monopolists, but they do confer 
market power on some authors. In Jamie Boyle’s words, “The question of whether a monopoly exists 
is one that is determined by the availability of substitute goods, not the shape of the legal entitlement.” 
Boyle, supra note 79, at 2018. 
 88. The correlation is rough because there exists no a priori basis to determine whether the value 
of the additional works generated by stronger intellectual property protection would exceed the 
increased deadweight loss associated with the works that would have been created even without the 
additional protection. Indeed, some have argued that information markets cannot operate efficiently. 
See id. at 2013 (citing Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of 
Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980)); Wendy J. Gordon, Assertive 
Modesty: An Economics of Intangibles, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2579, 2590 (1994). 
 Polk Wagner has introduced an additional complication. He argues that even a system of strong 
intellectual property protection will fail to give a work’s creator property rights over derivative 
information associated indirectly with creation. See Wagner, supra note 65, at 1002–10. As a result, if 
stronger protections do in fact incentivize creation of works, the value realized by the creator 
understates the total social gain generated by that strong protection. Id. at 1016–35. 
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D. Property and the Tragedy of the Commons 
1. Real and Intellectual Property: The Conventional View 
Much as property rights in land have been justified as a mechanism to 
prevent underinvestment in land, property rights have also been justified as a 
mechanism to prevent overexploitation. Garrett Hardin’s now-famous 
metaphor—the tragedy of the commons89—captures the essence of the 
problem.90 A common ownership regime results in overuse of resources 
because no individual user has an incentive to consider the effect of his own 
use on other potential users. Private property in land assures that these 
externalities are internalized to a single person—the owner of the land. The 
owner will act to maximize the land’s value, resulting in efficient use. 
Scholars have questioned whether intellectual property presents the same 
danger of overuse.91 Because intellectual works are public goods—one 
person’s consumption of a work does not interfere with consumption by 
others—property rights are not necessary to internalize externalities.92 At the 
same time, because intellectual works are public goods, propertizing them 
has the potential to generate inefficient underuse.93 
 89. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). 
 90. See generally Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 83, at 1045. 
 91. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 81, at 288–89; Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New 
Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 502 (1998); Rose, Roads, 
supra note 64, at 90 (noting that tragedy of the commons argument for private property falls away in 
intellectual space “since there is no physical resource to be ruined by overuse.”); Wagner, supra note 
65, at 1001 (“Because such goods cannot be depleted by overuse, theories based on avoidance of the 
tragedy of the commons drop away, leaving incentive-based theories as the core argument.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 92. The position has been articulated in a statement of copyright and intellectual property law 
professors opposing (unsuccessfully) the Copyright Term Extension Act: 
The fundamental difference between tangible and intellectual property is that intellectual property 
is a nondepletable commons, while tangible property necessarily depletes with use. “The tragedy 
of the commons” is that failure to recognize perpetual and transferable property rights in tangible 
property leads inevitably to “overgrazing,” as soon as the item of property enters the public 
domain from which everyone may draw freely. Recognition of perpetual property rights leads to 
economic efficiency, because a rational owner will optimize the balance between present and 
future consumption. 
 There can be no overgrazing of intellectual property, however, because intellectual property 
is not destroyed or even diminished by consumption. Once a work is created, its intellectual 
content is infinitely multipliable. 
Dennis S. Karjala, Statement of Copyright and Intellectual Property Law Professors in Opposition to 
H.R. 604, H.R. 2589, and S. 505, The Copyright Extension Act 9 (Jan. 28, 1998), reprinted in Landes 
& Posner, supra note 34, at 485. 
 93. See Boyle, supra note 79, at 2013. 
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2. Landes & Posner: Copyright Externalities 
Professors Landes and Posner have recently criticized this view,94 
suggesting instead that externalities are a problem with works of intellectual 
creation, and that the problem justifies permanent (or at least indefinitely 
renewable) property law protection.95 Landes and Posner start by assuming a 
work that has been protected by copyright for long enough that the expected 
return on the work would have been sufficient to induce creation even if the 
copyright expired immediately.96 In examining the effect that termination of 
copyright would have on such a work, they start by acknowledging that in 
the absence of externalities, termination would eliminate the deadweight loss 
that would result from the copyright holder’s decision to charge price P0 
when the marginal cost of an additional copy would be zero.97 Triangle 
P0Q0P2 illustrates that deadweight loss.98  
Landes and Posner then suggest, however, that if additional uses of the 
copyright work impose technological externalities, termination of copyright 
might result in a shift downward in the demand curve, from D0D0 to D0D1, 
potentially resulting in a loss in value that exceeds the deadweight loss 
associated with above-marginal-cost pricing.99  
Landes and Posner concede that termination of copyright would result in 
a net destruction of value only if externalities are “large,”100 and they 
concede that they “do not wish to press this argument too far.”101 
Nevertheless, they do draw the analogy to real property externalities, and 
they contend that unlimited reproduction of a celebrity’s name or likeness 
“could prematurely exhaust the celebrity’s commercial value, just as 
unlimited drilling from a common pool of oil or gas would deplete the pool 
prematurely.”102 Moreover, they suggest that premature exhaustion could 
also arise with copyrighted works, particularly “with regard to copyrights on 
components of completed works”—such as Mickey Mouse.103  
 94. Landes & Posner, supra note 34. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 487. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See infra fig.1. 
 99. As Landes and Posner put it, the result would destroy “value equal to the difference between 
the area under the original demand curve D0D0 up to P0 and the area under D0D1 up to a zero price.” 
Landes & Posner, supra note 34, at 487. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 488. 
 102. Id. at 487. 
 103. Id. 
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The Landes and Posner analysis, however, is unpersuasive for three 
reasons. First, they incorrectly attribute to copyright termination a shift in the 
demand curve associated with overexposure of intellectual work. Second, in 
their focus on the external costs associated with extensive use of intellectual 
work, they ignore external benefits. Third, their model focuses on the effect 
copyright termination would have on the market for individual works taken 
in isolation; they do not consider the effects of more global termination of 
copyright protection. 
a. Technological Externalities: Overexposure of Intellectual Work 
Assume the technological externalities hypothesized by Landes and 
Posner. That is, assume that each additional use of an intellectual work 
reduces the marginal value of the work to other users. As a result, the 
demand curve for the work is not D0D0, but instead D0D1.104 Note, however, 
that even if we extend copyright protection to the work, internalizing any 
externalities by permitting the copyright holder to control the number of units 
of work distributed, the demand curve does not shift upward to D0D0.105 Even 
with copyright protection, if suppliers of the work supply quantity Q0, they 
cannot obtain price P0, but only price P1.106 That is, the quantity Q that 
prospective purchasers will demand at any price P reflects a discount for 
market saturation.107 
 104. See infra fig.1. 
 105. Landes & Posner, supra note 34, at 437. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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FIGURE 1 
P0
D0 
D1 D0
Q1 Q2Q0
QUANTITY
Assume now that copyright in the work is terminated. Termination does 
not reduce the number of units purchasers will be willing to purchase at any 
given price; given the assumptions Landes and Posner make about market 
saturation, demand will reflect market saturation whether or not the legal 
regime protects copyright. It is the market saturation, Landes and Posner 
hypothesize, not termination of the copyright, that generates the shift from 
D0D0 to D0D1. Landes and Posner appear to be incorrect when they assert: 
“[S]uppose that, contrary to the usual assumption about copyrights, 
additional uses impose technological externalities. Then terminating the 
copyright will lead not only to a movement along the demand curve but also 
to a downward shift (say to D0D1) in the overall demand.”108 Instead, 
terminating the copyright will generate marginal cost pricing, which will lead 
to movement down the demand curve, but the same demand curve, D0D1, 
would apply whether or not the regime protected copyright. 
This error infects their analysis because they go on to assert that 
termination will destroy “value equal to the difference between the area 
under the original demand curve D0D0 up to P0 and the area under D0D1 up to 
 108. Id. (emphasis added). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss2/1
p417 Sterk book pages.doc 11/18/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] INTELLECTUALIZING PROPERTY 439 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a zero price.”109 This assertion assumes that the area under demand curve 
D0D0 represents the value of the work. But this assumption is incorrect. D0D0 
does not capture any real demand; instead, it represents the demand for the 
work only on the assumption—inconsistent with the Landes and Posner 
hypothesis—that the value to any individual purchaser is independent of the 
quantity of units purchased by others. Once we factor in the congestion 
effects Landes and Posner hypothesize, the only “real” demand curve is 
D0D1.  
Even the area under the demand curve D0D1 overstates consumer surplus, 
and therefore the value of the work. Ordinarily, when the cost of producing a 
good is zero, the area under the demand curve captures the value of the 
work,110 but not when the value to individual purchasers is dependent on the 
quantity of units purchased by others. In the Landes and Posner example, a 
consumer who would pay a price Px for a work if Qz units were purchased by 
others would only be willing to pay the lesser price Px-y for the same work if 
the larger quantity Qz+w were purchased by others. As a result, as each 
additional unit is consumed, the value of all of the other units diminishes, 
undermining the conclusion that the area under the demand curve represents 
aggregate consumer surplus. Moreover, in a regime where the copyright has 
been terminated, and where more of the work will therefore be consumed, 
the area under the demand curve will represent a more serious overstatement 
of the product’s value than in a copyright protection regime, where, by 
hypothesis, fewer units will be produced. In this sense, copyright termination 
could result in a loss in value. Perhaps this is the loss Landes and Posner 
mean to identify, but it is not the loss they describe. 
b. External Benefits and External Costs 
Next, even if the external costs identified by Landes and Posner could 
generate a loss in value, Landes and Posner ignore external benefits likely to 
be both more common and more significant than the external costs they 
identify. Intellectual works have the potential to generate network effects.111 
 109. Id. 
 110. But cf. Michael J. Meurer, Copyright and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55, 
90–100 (2001) (noting that area under demand curve overstates value created by the work’s author if 
some of the demand reflects diversion of demand from other works). 
 111. As Mark Lemley and David McGowan have put it, “a network effect exists where purchasers 
find a good more valuable as additional purchasers buy the same good.” Mark A. Lemley & David 
McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 483 (1998); see 
also Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 
1212 (2000) (“[N]etwork effects are present when a consumer’s utility associated with a good 
increases as others also purchase it.”) (citing Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, 
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The greater the circulation of a work of art or literature, the more valuable the 
work becomes in facilitating social and professional discourse. If I were the 
only person to read a novel or see a movie, I would have no one with whom I 
could discuss the work. Each additional consumer of the work creates value 
for me—value external to the demand curve faced by the publisher. This 
network effect exists (in different manifestations) for all intellectual works. If 
all students in a law school class are familiar with the works of Locke or 
Coase, I will be able to explore some issues more effectively than if only a 
fraction of the students are familiar with those works. If students learn more 
as a result, the benefit will be felt by their clients—not by an owner of the 
intellectual works of Locke or Coase.  
By contrast, the external costs identified by Landes and Posner arise 
principally when intellectual works are used as symbols. Their arguments 
focus largely on the symbolic value of copyrighted characters,112 by analogy 
to their argument that the right of publicity may be necessary to avoid 
dissipation of the advertising value of the image of famous persons.113 
Outside that realm, it is difficult to imagine works of music, art, or literature 
whose intrinsic value to consumers is reduced by knowledge that the works 
are widely disseminated.114  
 
 
Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985)). 
 The classic network effect arises with a telephone network, where each new subscriber increases 
the value of the network to all previous subscribers. Lemley & McGowan, supra, at 488–89. 
Compatible computer software also generates network effects. For instance, compatible software 
makes file-sharing easier than it would be if all programs were incompatible. Id. at 491.  
 112. After noting that a celebrity’s commercial value can be prematurely exhausted, “just as 
unlimited drilling from a common pool of oil or gas would deplete the pool prematurely,” Landes and 
Posner assert that “[t]he same could be true of a novel or a movie or a comic book character or a piece 
of music or a painting, particularly with regard to copyrights on components of completed works 
rather than on the completed works themselves.” Landes & Posner, supra note 34, at 487 (emphasis 
added). They explicitly use Mickey Mouse as an example and suggest that if everyone were free to 
incorporate the Mickey Mouse character into a book, movie, or song, the public might tire of Mickey, 
and “his image would be blurred” as authors portrayed him in different lights. Id. at 487–88. 
 113. Id. at 486 (discussing tarnishing of advertising value of Humphrey Bogart). 
 114. Landes and Posner offer three examples of “works of elite culture that may have been 
debased by unlimited reproduction”: the Mona Lisa, the opening of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, and 
several Van Gogh paintings. Id. at 488. Although proof or disproof of this assertion would be difficult 
to come by, it would appear that the public’s widespread familiarity with these works contributes to 
their value for symbolic purposes. Moreover, my surmise is that symphony orchestras have an easier 
time selling tickets for a performance of Beethoven’s Fifth than they would if the symphony were less 
frequently exposed to the public, and that any museum would be delighted to have the opportunity to 
display the Mona Lisa—not because of the painting’s intrinsic merit, but because of its familiarity.  
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c. The Static Nature of the Landes/Posner Model 
Suppose the negative externalities hypothesized by Landes and Posner 
were significant, and positive externalities were not. Suppose further that 
termination of copyright in a particular work would result in a loss in value 
of that work. That loss in value does not translate to inefficiency if the overall 
result of the change is to compensate for that loss with commensurate 
increases in value of other goods and services in the economy.115 
The Landes and Posner model examines termination of copyright in a 
single work—say, Mickey Mouse. Termination of Mickey’s copyright, and 
the resulting drop in price to marginal cost, leads more authors and producers 
to use Mickey, resulting in a loss in value to those who would pay to exploit 
Mickey as a symbol (but who find Mickey’s symbolic value reduced by 
market saturation). But if we assume that substitutes for Mickey (perhaps Big 
Bird or Barney) remain subject to copyright protection, an efficiency analysis 
would have to account for the impact of Mickey’s termination on the value of 
those other works. 
The demand curve for substitutes (take Big Bird as an example) would 
certainly shift, but the direction and magnitude of the shift would depend on 
the cross-elasticity of demand for Mickey and Big Bird in two separate 
markets—the market of purchasers interested in the entertainment value of 
the characters, and the market of those interested in exploiting their symbolic 
value. For those interested in entertainment value, the demand for Big Bird 
would decline to the extent that Mickey is a good substitute who has now 
become available at a lower price.116 For those interested in symbolic value, 
the demand for Big Bird would increase, because Mickey, at his new lower 
price and higher quantity, is no longer a good substitute.117 Whether these 
two competing factors will lead to an increase or decrease in the equilibrium 
price for Big Bird, and whether the result will be a higher or lower value for 
 115. Christopher Yoo has observed that the consumer surplus associated with a particular 
copyrighted work does not always reflect increased economic welfare as a result of production of that 
work. Christopher Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 260–61 
(2004). Instead, some of that surplus reflects demand diverted from other works. Id.  
 116. See generally RICHARD H. LEFTWICH, THE PRICE SYSTEM AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 48 
(4th ed. 1970) (cross elasticities of demand for closely related goods is high and positive); GEORGE A. 
STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 33 (3d ed. 1966) (close technical substitutes will have positive cross-
elasticities). 
 117. This assumes, however, a limited number of alternatives to Mickey and Big Bird. If there 
were many other comparable symbols that retained copyright protection, then loss of Mickey as a 
substitute would have only a marginal impact on Big Bird. Cf. STIGLER, supra note 116, at 243 
(discussing cross-elasticity of demand for services used to produce a product for sale, and concluding 
that “the demand for a service is more elastic, the more readily other services may be substituted for 
it.”). 
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Big Bird, is entirely indeterminate without knowledge about the cross-
elasticity of demand for these and other intellectual works. Hence, even if 
copyright termination would reduce the value of Mickey Mouse, termination 
need not result in inefficiency. 
So far, the assumption has been that copyright in Mickey Mouse has been 
terminated, but that other works have remained subject to copyright 
protection. Suppose, however, that all copyright protection were eliminated. 
Would that result in an overall reduction in value (leaving aside the effects 
the reduction would have on the incentive to create)? First, microeconomic 
comparisons of such globally different economic situations are fraught with 
difficulty; economists take care to change one variable at a time and to 
qualify their conclusions with the phrase “ceteris paribus” (other things 
being equal).118 Second, any global comparison would have to examine the 
percentage of intellectual works imbued with significant symbolic value; for 
other works, marginal cost pricing generates no external costs. Eliminating 
copyright protection would generate increased value for all works; the loss in 
value Landes and Posner hypothesize would apply to a narrower set of 
works. In short, if Landes and Posner bear any burden of proof in their effort 
to establish that externalities justify copyright protection, they have not met 
that burden. 
E. Property and Incentives to Invest and Develop 
Although private property rights cannot induce creation of additional 
land, it has become a commonplace to justify private property as a 
mechanism for optimizing use and development of land. One important 
aspect of this optimization is the incentive property creates for an owner to 
invest in a resource. Self-interested actors will underinvest in a resource that 
is not propertized because the investor will not reap the benefits of her 
investment.119 At the most primitive level, imagine a person whose only 
resource is his labor. He can hunt all year for nuts and berries (yielding 100 
berry-equivalents a year), or he can spend part of the year cultivating ten 
berry-equivalents so that the following year he can reap 100 berry-
 118. See, e.g., CHARLES L. COLE, MICROECONOMICS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 8 (1973) 
(discussing importance of ceteris paribus); see also STIGLER, supra note 116, at 32–33 (noting that 
demand curve for product is specified only if prices of close substitutes or complements are held 
constant, and noting difficulty of articulating empirical rule for the effects of prices of related goods in 
a world where each product competes with many others in disparate markets). 
 119. As Thomas Merrill has put it, “Property concentrates the risks and rewards of investment on 
designated individuals, thus assuring a correspondence between those who sow and those who reap.” 
Merrill, supra note 68, at S332. 
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equivalents in six months. If land is not propertized, cultivation may not be in 
his economic self-interest. His sacrifice of ten berry-equivalents may not 
generate a positive return because others will reap most of what he has sown. 
That is, cultivating berries—investing in the land—will generate external 
benefits for other gatherers, leading to underdevelopment of the land.120 
This same incentive-to-invest justification has been advanced with respect 
to intellectual property. At bottom, this incentive-to-invest justification is a 
variant of the tragedy of the commons justification, although it has often 
been treated separately in the intellectual property literature.121 The argument 
was set out most extensively by Edmund Kitch in the patent context.122 Kitch 
argued that broad patent rights function to limit wasteful duplicate 
expenditures to develop an existing invention.123 Without patent rights, many 
parties would have incentives to compete to develop inventions that build on 
the status quo.124 Prospect patents, according to Kitch, would put a single 
owner in a position to coordinate research efforts toward enhancement of the 
patent’s value, increasing efficiency of the investment in innovation.125 
Versions of Kitch’s argument have also found their way into the 
copyright literature.126 Notice how this argument relates to the tragedy of the 
commons. Kitch is essentially asserting that inventions are not non-rival; that 
every person who seeks to develop an invention reduces the value of the 
invention for every other potential developer. Property rights, on this theory, 
 120. Landowner also has an incentive to make the particular investment that maximizes his return 
on the land. That return will generate a price for the land that assures the land will be used as a 
resource only when some other resource could not be employed more efficiently. See generally 
SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 41, at 323 (discussing tradeoffs between use of land and use of 
other resources). 
 121. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 65, at 1001 (noting that “the individual incentives generated by 
a system of private property helps assure the appropriate level of investment in development or 
improvement of resources,” and noting that this justification—unlike a justification emphasizing 
prevention of resource overuse—applies both to tangible and intellectual property). 
 122. In a classic 1977 article, Edmund Kitch developed what has become known as the “prospect 
theory” of patents. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 
265 (1977). Kitch argued that the patent system should not be regarded merely as one designed to 
generate incentives to create, but that propertization of patent rights would lead to efficient 
development of patented works. See id. at 276. 
 123. Id. at 276. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Neoclassicist copyright scholars have argued that copyright serves to “rationalize the 
‘development’ of existing creative works and sell exploitation entitlements to those who are best able 
to satisfy public tastes.” Netanel, supra note 57, at 309. For works in the forefront of that movement, 
see Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry Into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, 
Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (1989); William M. Landes & Richard 
A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989). 
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are necessary to eliminate the external costs associated with efforts to 
develop the invention. 
As a justification for copyright, Kitch’s theory is problematic for several 
reasons. First, it is not at all clear that innovation develops in the same way 
with respect to works of authorship as it does with respect to inventions. 
Multiple scientists seeking to build on an existing invention would be likely 
to pursue many of the same approaches, even if they work independently, 
leading to precise duplication of effort. That is especially true because many 
of the scientists will be pursuing a common goal: an invention that achieves a 
particular result. By contrast, in many contexts at least, creators of works of 
authorship are less directed to a common goal, and there is less reason to 
think that their separate efforts to build on existing works will prove 
wasteful. 
Second, even on its own terms, Kitch’s argument is problematic. 
Professors McFetridge and Smith have demonstrated that a broad patent right 
does not eliminate rivalry; instead, a broad patent right shifts rivalry earlier in 
time by increasing the financial incentive to develop a foundational 
invention.127 John Duffy has recently resuscitated the Kitch theory in part, 
but only by demonstrating that the principal benefit of a broad patent is to 
accelerate the time at which the invention finds its way into the public 
domain.128 The longer the duration of the property right, the smaller this 
advantage becomes and the weaker the justification for copyright (or patent) 
as an incentive to develop.  
Third, Kitch’s argument assumes that rivalry is inefficient by comparison 
to coordinated development. That assumption, however, flies in the face both 
of our general market preferences and of our treatment of works of 
authorship in particular.129 If coordinated development of intellectual works 
were generally more efficient than rivalry, one might expect government to 
auction off exclusive rights to innovate in particular areas, rather than leaving 
innovation to competitive forces. We do not typically see that pattern; 
instead, our legal system generally assumes that market competition—rivalry 
among competing creators—will generally lead to more efficient creative 
 127. See Donald G. McFetridge & Douglas A. Smith, Patents, Prospects, and Economic Surplus: 
A Comment, 23 J.L. & ECON. 197, 198–201 (1980). 
 128. John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 475–81 
(2004). 
 129. See generally Mark Lemley, Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 135–41 (2004) [hereinafter Lemley, Ex Ante] (arguing that investment-based 
argument for intellectual property rights unduly discounts the advantages of competition and the 
disadvantages of monopoly). 
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activity.130 Although the question is ultimately an empirical one,131 if one 
concludes that rivalry is more efficient than coordinated development for 
innovation that does not build on existing rights, it is difficult to imagine why 
rivalry would not also be more efficient than coordinated development for 
innovation that does build on existing rights. 
The difficulties with the prospect theory do not, of course, establish that 
the creator of a work of authorship should not have an exclusive right to 
develop that work. But if the legal system accords the creator such an 
exclusive right, that right is justified not by a notion that the creator is in the 
best position to coordinate further development, but by the need to provide 
creators with an adequate incentive to create original works.132 The incentive-
to-develop justification, like the tragedy of the commons justification, has 
little persuasive force with respect to works of authorship.  
F. Summary 
Analogies between copyright and real property must rest on one of two 
premises. The first premise is that all value should be propertized. In that 
event, because both land and intellectual works represent value, they should 
receive the same legal protection. The second, alternative, premise is that 
even if value should not always be propertized, the particular reasons for 
propertizing land and intellectual works are so closely related that legal 
protection, too, should be closely related. 
This part started by demonstrating that the universal propertization 
premise is untenable. Succeeding sections examine the particular reasons for 
propertizing land and intellectual works, demonstrating that two of the 
justifications for property rights in land—avoiding breaches of the peace and 
tragedies of the commons—are far less persuasive as justifications for 
property rights in intellectual works. Conversely, the most widely accepted 
justification for property rights in intellectual works—the need to provide an 
incentive for creation of those works—is completely inapplicable to land.  
Let us assume that legal doctrine is generally, if imperfectly, founded on 
some justification. If the justifications for propertizing intellectual work 
 130. See generally Duffy, supra note 128, at 490 (contending that the insight that lies at the heart 
of the patent system is that “[c]ompetition to obtain, and to maintain, a monopoly position can be 
harnessed to constrain the monopolist and to increase social welfare.”). 
 131. Lemley, Ex Ante, supra note 129, at 140 (noting that whether the creator of the original work 
is better suited than the market to coordinate further development of the work is at bottom an empirical 
question). 
 132. Cf. Sterk, supra note 26, at 1215–17 (questioning whether incentive to create justifies broad 
protection of derivative works). 
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closely paralleled the justifications for propertizing real property, one might 
expect legal doctrine to feature similar parallels. But because the 
justifications diverge in important respects, we would expect to find 
divergence between doctrines surrounding property in land and those 
surrounding property in intellectual work. The next part explores that 
divergence. 
III. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS  
Copyright doctrine diverges from real property doctrine in fundamental 
respects. Property rights in land are potentially infinite in duration; 
copyrights are time-limited. Landowners generally enjoy broad exclusion 
rights, while copyright embraces a number of doctrines—fair use and first 
sale among them—that limit the copyright owner’s right to exclude. 
Injunctive relief is the standard remedy for encroachment on real property 
rights, while in a significant subset of copyright cases courts have limited 
copyright holders to money damages. In each of these areas, copyright 
doctrine should and does differ from real property doctrine because differing 
justifications lead to different doctrinal frameworks. This part starts by 
demonstrating how the doctrinal divergences track the different justifications 
in the two areas. 
Finally, the part closes with an examination of an area in which current 
doctrine is hotly contested—the power of parties to vary property rights by 
contract—and shows that here, too, the disparities in justification can shed 
light on the appropriate shape of doctrine. In particular, the part demonstrates 
that analogy to real property doctrine does not, by itself, justify a regime in 
which parties are free to enlarge copyright protection by contract. 
A. Duration of Rights 
Perhaps the most evident doctrinal difference between property interests 
in land and property interests in copyrighted works is the difference in 
duration. Property interests in land are potentially infinite in duration. 
Landowners may choose to carve up ownership interests in a wide variety of 
patterns,133 but ownership interests do not generally expire.134 Copyright, by 
 133. Professors Merrill and Smith have argued that property rights must conform to standard 
forms, essentially limiting the number of patterns. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal 
Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000) 
[hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization]. 
 134. State statutes that limit the duration of possibilities of reverter or rights of entry are an 
exception. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184A, § 7 (2004). Other statutes provide that such interests 
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constitutional command, is limited in duration,135 although Congress appears 
willing to test the constitutional limit.136 
This difference is consistent with the differing justifications for the two 
sets of rights. Threats of breach of the peace are timeless. Putting a scarce, 
valuable, and durable resource “up for grabs” inevitably invites disputes, and 
extra-legal resolution of those disputes. Similarly, the potential for overuse—
the tragedy of the commons—does not diminish with time. As a result, the 
reasons that support recognizing property rights in land also support 
perpetual duration.137 
By contrast, to the extent that copyright rests on the need to provide 
potential creators with a socially optimal incentive to create, permanence 
may be neither necessary nor desirable. Compare property rights in 
intellectual works with property rights in tangible goods—compare a novel 
with a chair. Elementary economic principles teach that when a chair 
manufacturer has a property right in the chairs he produces, each 
manufacturer will produce the socially optimal number of chairs. 
Manufacturers will produce so long as the marginal cost of producing 
another chair is less than the price consumers are willing to pay for an 
additional chair. Each manufacturer has an incentive to produce chairs that 
benefit prospective purchasers more than the chairs cost to produce; no 
manufacturer has an incentive to produce chairs that benefit prospective 
purchasers less than they cost to produce. 
A novel (or a song or a computer program) is less concrete than a chair; 
the novel is an organized collection of words that has an existence apart from 
its manifestation on a printed page. We could (and do) give the novelist a 
property right in the physical manifestation of the novel, in the same way we 
give the chair manufacturer a property right in the physical manifestation of 
the chair. But the physical manifestation of the novel is cheap to produce; the 
hard work is in organizing the words into an attractive whole, while the 
marginal cost of making another physical copy is quite small. As a result, 
giving the novelist a property right only in physical copies will lead to 
underproduction of novels. Marginal cost pricing will lead to a price lower 
 
 
expire unless re-recorded after a specified period. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 885.030 (West 2004); 
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 345 (McKinney 2004).  
 135. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 136. One notable example is the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-
298, tit. I, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998), which extended the copyright period by twenty years both for new 
works and for works already created. The Supreme Court upheld the statute against constitutional 
challenge in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).  
 137. See also Richard A. Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension 
Act, 36 LOY. L.A L. REV. 123, 125 (2002) (noting that reasons for recognizing property rights in land 
dictate infinite duration). 
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than the average cost necessary to produce the novel.138 Some novelists will 
not write—and some publishers will not publish—even though the expected 
value of their work would exceed its expected total cost.139 
To enable the novelist to recover the initial cost of writing the novel, 
copyright gives the novelist an exclusive right to reproduce the novel.140 But 
this right is at best a rough approximation of the return necessary to induce 
optimal production of novels; no theory links copyright protection of any 
particular duration—temporary or permanent—with optimal production of 
intellectual works.141 What theory does teach is first, that copyright generates 
dead-weight losses associated with above-marginal cost pricing,142 and 
second, that the marginal impact of copyright protection on potential creators 
declines over time; an additional ten years of protection will provide far less 
incentive to a potential creator who starts with fifty years of protection than 
to one who starts with no protection at all.143 The combined force of these 
 138. See Meurer, supra note 110, at 94 (“Competition would drive the price of the work toward 
the marginal cost of reproduction. The author and publisher might not be able to cover the fixed costs 
of publishing the original work.”). 
 139. Christopher Yoo has described the conundrum that faces those who analyze the efficiency of 
copyright rules: 
When goods are nonrival, there is no volume at which marginal cost equals or exceeds average 
cost. As a result, no level of production exists that provides optimal access to the work while 
simultaneously providing authors with the expectation of sufficient revenue to induce the work’s 
creation. This suggests that absent some other institutional solution, some degree of deadweight 
loss is endemic to markets for copyrighted works. 
Yoo, supra note 115, at 228. 
 140. Under 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2005), the owner of copyright has the exclusive rights to 
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords. 
 141. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 137, at 126–27: “[J]ust how limited the grant should be and 
why are complex questions which help demonstrate the reasons for copyright and patent statutes being 
subject to constant refinement and modification. The real issue in both cases concerns where and how 
to draw the line.” 
 142. It has become commonplace to note that if the copyright owner were able to engage in 
perfect price discrimination, deadweight losses would disappear because the copyright owner would 
distribute works to potential purchasers, each of whom would be willing to pay more than the marginal 
cost of distributing an additional copy. See, e.g., Meurer, supra note 110, at 68–69 (describing perfect 
price discrimination). 
 Price discrimination, however, is not profitable unless copyright holders can inexpensively (1) sort 
consumers, and (2) block arbitrage. See Michael J. Meurer, Vertical Restraints and Intellectual 
Property Law: Beyond Antitrust, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1871, 1875–77 (2003). Moreover, Julie Cohen has 
argued that even perfect price discrimination will lead to underproduction of information goods that 
generate significant public benefits. Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. 
REV. 1799, 1822 (2000). Because these creators cannot appropriate all of the value associated with 
their work, they will undervalue the use of pre-existing works, making a system of price discrimination 
inefficient. Id. at 1801. And others have observed the distributional effect of perfect price 
discrimination, which prefers producers over consumers. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 79, at 2025–26 
(“Perfect competition moves consumer surplus to the pockets of consumers. Monopoly coupled with 
perfect price discrimination moves the surplus to the pockets of the producer.”). 
 143. The economists who filed an amicus brief in Eldred v. Ashcroft calculate that, assuming a 
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insights leads to copyright of limited duration and to debates about how long 
that duration should be. 
Professors Landes and Posner have recently offered several examples to 
challenge the conclusion that an incentive rationale supports only a limited 
duration for copyright protection.144 Although some of their examples 
identify economic problems that would be alleviated by permanent copyright 
duration, the problems hardly appear sufficiently pervasive to justify a 
blanket rule permitting indefinitely renewable copyright. For example, they 
note that under current law, a publisher has little incentive to promote an 
obscure eminent domain author because competitive publishers could 
quickly freeride on successful promotion efforts without bearing the cost of 
unsuccessful efforts.145 Although their conclusion is logically correct, an 
amicus brief signed by five winners of the Nobel Prize in Economics 
provides adequate response: “Such cases would occur in at most a small 
subset of copyrights, since extension has an incremental effect only after 
many years of copyright, and . . . most works lose their economic value to the 
initial copyright owner after a very few years.”146 Moreover, even if some 
incentive might be necessary to eliminate freeriders, it is not clear why 
indefinitely renewable copyright would be superior to a regime in which law 
directly protected the current promoter of the obscure work.147 
B. Scope of the Right to Exclude 
The right to exclude has often been treated as the most basic in the 
“bundle of sticks” that make up real property.148 Thus, the United States 
Supreme Court has held, as a matter of constitutional law, that government’s 
 
 
constant stream of revenues and a 7% real interest rate, the present value of a twenty-year extension to 
an eighty-year copyright period would be worth 0.33% of the present value of the initial eighty-year 
period. Brief for George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) 
(No. 01-618), at 6 [hereinafter Akerlof Brief]. The brief notes that the figure probably overstates the 
value of the extension, because the assumption of a constant stream of revenues is inconsistent with 
the fact that most works lose value over time. Id. at 7. 
 See also Wendy J. Gordon, Authors, Publishers, and Public Goods: Trading Gold for Dross, 36 
LOY. L.A L. REV. 159, 180–87 (2002). 
 144. Landes & Posner, supra note 34, at 488–89. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Akerlof Brief, supra note 143, at 9. 
 147. Mark Lemley has made this point with respect to improvements in intellectual works: “But 
the need to encourage improvements does not tell us who should receive the appropriate incentive. The 
logical a priori answer must be that the creator of the improvement should receive an intellectual 
property right, just as the creator of the initial invention received such a right.” Lemley, supra note 
129, at 139 (emphasis added).  
 148. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179–80 (1979) (characterizing right to 
exclude as a “fundamental element of the property right.”). 
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permanent physical occupation of land—interference with the landowner’s 
right to exclude—constitutes a per se taking of property.149 Moreover, as a 
matter of common law, a landowner is entitled to prevail in an action for 
trespass even without proof of damages.150 Courts do not engage in balancing 
the interests of the landowner against the interest of competing users; the 
landowner’s right to exclude is nearly absolute, qualified only by a limited 
defense permitting use of another’s land in cases of dire necessity.151 
By contrast, the right to exclude in copyright is far more limited. First, an 
author is not entitled to prevent others from appropriating the ideas embodied 
in her work; copyright protection extends only to expression.152 Second, the 
fair use doctrine qualifies even the right to exclude others from using the 
author’s expression.153 Section 107 of the Copyright Act expressly 
incorporates a balancing test to determine whether appropriation of an 
author’s work constitutes copyright infringement or fair use.154 
This sharp distinction between the exclusion rights enjoyed by 
landowners and authors is consistent with the differing justifications for real 
property and copyright. When preserving peace is at stake, clear rules present 
significant advantages. The conventional property story, in Carol Rose’s 
words, is that “[w]e establish a system of clear entitlements so that we can 
barter and trade for what we want instead of fighting.”155 Rules that treat 
parcels of land as discrete geometric boxes over which a single owner 
controls entry minimize the advantage of encroachments that could, in turn, 
lead to physical conflict with the owner. The more exceptions to the 
landowner’s right to exclude, the more incentive a potential user has to 
encroach rather than negotiating for the rights he wants. And when land is at 
issue, encroachment inevitably presents the possibility of physical conflict. 
To the extent that real property rights are designed to prevent overuse of a 
scarce resource—to avoid the tragedy of the commons—clear exclusion rules 
again have distinct advantages. An owner with the power to exclude is in an 
ideal position to coordinate use of land by private bargain, whether embodied 
in formal contracts, leases, or deeds; or manifested in implied 
 149. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
 150. 6-A, AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 28.12 (A. James Casner ed., 1954). 
 151. Id. § 28.10 (privilege exists in case of private necessity when intruder enters land to save 
himself or his own property); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS § 2.15.1, at 60–63 (1999). 
 152. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery. . . .”); see also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
 153. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). 
 154. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (listing factors relevant to determination). 
 155. Rose, Crystals and Mud, supra note 4, at 578. 
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understandings.156 The owner can choose whether to negotiate, and with 
whom, minimizing the number of necessary transactions. By contrast, rules 
that limit the power to exclude increase coordination costs: if multiple 
persons have rights to use or possess land, negotiations with each of them 
may be necessary to prevent inefficient exploitation, and the more uncertain 
the scope of the owner’s right to exclude, the more costly those negotiations 
might become.157 
Indeed, the one clear exception to the right to exclude—the privilege or 
defense of “necessity”—occurs when market failure prevents optimal 
coordination among potential land users. Thus, when a ship owner uses 
another’s private dock in the midst of a storm, the dock owner is not entitled 
to exclude the ship from the dock.158 If the weather makes the ship owner’s 
need imminent, and the ship owner cannot find the dock owner to seek 
permission, the market failure is clear. But even if the ship owner finds the 
dock owner, and the dock owner refuses to permit use of the dock, failure to 
reach an agreement may well be the product of bargaining breakdown due to 
the bilateral monopoly in which the parties find themselves; when the 
necessity is great, the ship owner almost certainly values the right to use the 
dock more than the dock owner values the right to exclude.159  
Now consider copyright. To the extent that copyright protection is 
designed as an inducement to create, an absolute right to exclude proves 
counterproductive. First, the monopoly power inherent in copyright 
protection permits the copyright holder to charge potential users—including 
potential creators seeking to build on earlier work—a price that exceeds the 
original creator’s marginal cost.160 If the copyright holder’s right to exclude 
is more extensive than would have been necessary to induce initial creation 
of the work, the resulting disincentive to creation generates a deadweight 
loss. Second, transaction costs might prevent subsequent creators from using 
 156. Cf. Sterk, supra note 36, at 96–99 (noting that obligations to neighbors may arise out of 
course of dealing). 
 157. This insight explains, in part, the general availability of a partition remedy to resolve disputes 
among disputing co-owners (see generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 150, § 6.21), 
and the changed conditions doctrine, which permits judicial modification or termination of a servitude 
(see generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 7.10 (2000)). See also Stewart E. 
Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70 IOWA L. 
REV. 615, 631–33 (1985) (contending that failure of multiple parties to reach a bargain to terminate a 
servitude constitutes weak evidence that the servitude remains efficient). But see Richard A. Epstein, 
Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1368 (1982) 
(arguing that covenanting parties can be trusted to anticipate the possible future desire to terminate). 
 158. Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908). 
 159. See EPSTEIN, supra note 151, § 2.15.1, at 62. 
 160. See Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 83, at 998. But cf. Wagner, supra note 
65, at 1013–14 (noting limits of monopoly power). 
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copyrighted works even in those cases where the value to the subsequent 
creator exceeds the price the original creator would charge.161 
The prohibition on copyrighting an idea responds to the monopoly power 
problem.162 Suppose a novelist were to write about the interaction of a 
fundamentalist Christian family and an Orthodox Jewish family over the 
union between their gay sons, starting with anger and rejection and working 
through to reconciliation. The work becomes a critical and popular success. 
Should the author be able to exclude others from exploring the same idea? 
Copyright law’s answer is no; subsequent creators are free to develop the 
idea as they see fit, so long as the details of the expression are original.163 
The compromise prevents the original author from monopolizing a literary 
space broader than necessary to induce the original novel. 
The fair use doctrine responds both to the monopoly power problem and 
to the transaction cost problem. Fair use limits the right of an author to 
monopolize even expression when the result would limit the ability of 
subsequent creators to explore matters of significant value to the public.164 
For example, in Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates,165 the court invoked 
the fair use doctrine to dismiss an infringement claim by Time, Inc., which 
had purchased rights to the Zapruder film of the Kennedy assassination and 
then sought to prevent use of the frames by an author preparing a study of the 
assassination.166 Absent application of the fair use doctrine, Time’s 
monopoly over the work would have generated a deadweight loss with 
respect to a work whose creation was almost certainly unaffected by 
copyright’s incentive structure. 
Fair use also permits incidental use of copyrighted work in those cases 
where the value of the work to the user would not justify the transaction cost 
of obtaining permission from the author;167 incidental classroom use of 
 161. Wendy Gordon emphasized this point in analyzing the legal status of television time-shifting. 
Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax 
Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982). 
 162. Cf. Hughes, supra note 17, at 320 (noting that everyday ideas and extraordinary ideas are too 
useful to allow any person to monopolize them). 
 163. Cf. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 123 (1930), cert. denied 282 U.S. 902 
(1931) (“A comedy based upon conflicts between Irish and Jews, into which the marriage of their 
children enters, is not more susceptible of copyright than the outline of Romeo and Juliet.”). 
 164. See Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 
15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 45 (2001) (fair use fosters “an aware and educated populace better able to 
participate in both public debate and the creation of future works of authorship.”). 
 165. 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).  
 166. Mark Lemley cautions, however, that fair use of this sort might be less available when the 
proposed use is commercial. Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 83, at 1026–29. 
 167. Wendy Gordon highlighted this market failure problem in her discussion of television time-
shifting. Gordon, supra note 161, at 1601. 
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copyrighted material furnishes a prime example.168 Quoting a sentence from 
a law review article provides another. In neither case would a right to exclude 
provide significant incentives to production of creative work. 
C. Remedies 
Although “property rule” protection—injunctive relief—remains the 
standard remedy both in real property cases and copyright cases, doctrine 
nevertheless reflects the different justifications that underlie real property and 
copyright.  
1. Real Property  
A landowner is generally entitled to injunctive relief against an 
encroacher who interferes with his right to possession.169 Similarly, 
injunctive relief is the norm when a landowner seeks to vindicate non-
possessory rights, including easements and restrictive covenants.170  
The principal exceptions to property rule protection are two. The first 
(and most familiar in the economic literature) includes cases in which 
holdout or freerider problems would impede negotiations to an efficient 
result.171 The second exception, one that is not consistently applied, denies 
injunctive relief when a plaintiff landowner is himself the person in the best 
position to avoid conflict with an encroaching neighbor, generally by 
warning the encroacher of the existence and potential consequences of the 
encroachment. Thus, when a neighbor begins construction in a way that 
encroaches on landowner’s parcel, and landowner permits completion of the 
 
 
 As Professors Burk and Cohen have noted, when transaction costs are low, this type of market 
failure theory, by itself, justifies finding fair use only for “unauthorized uses of relatively minor 
value.” Burk & Cohen, supra note 164, at 44. 
 168. See H.R. REP. NO. 1476, at 68–71 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680–85 
(setting out agreement on guidelines for classroom copying); H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 1733, at 70 (1976), 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5810 (House and Senate Conferees accept guidelines as “part of their 
understanding of fair use.”). 
 169. See 6-A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 150, § 28.17 (“Injunctions have generally 
issued against repeated or continuous acts of constructing, maintaining or removing fences, intrusions 
for hunting or fishing purposes, trespasses by livestock, and interferences of such a nature as to impair 
the plaintiff’s use of the premises.”); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 151, § 110.4 (discussing remedies 
for trespass). 
 170. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 8.3 cmt. b (2000): “Injunctive 
relief is normally available to redress violations of easements and restrictive covenants without proof 
of irreparable injury or a showing that damages would be inadequate.” See also Turner Adver. Co. v. 
Garcia, 311 S.E.2d 466 (Ga. 1984); Gladstone v. Gregory, 596 P.2d 491 (Nev. 1979). 
 171. The classic example remains Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970), 
involving the harm caused to neighboring homeowners by a cement plant. 
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construction before objecting, courts may limit landowner to money 
damages.172 Similarly, if a landowner makes improvements in the obvious 
but erroneous belief that an easement will give him access to the 
improvements, courts may deny injunctive relief to the neighboring servient 
owner.173 Outside these exceptions (and the government’s eminent domain 
power), injunctive relief remains the usual remedy in real property cases. 
The general availability of injunctive relief to protect rights in real 
property, in tandem with a broad right to exclude, operates to minimize 
breaches of the peace. Ex ante negotiations among potentially disputing 
parties are the most effective mechanism for avoiding breaches of the peace. 
Injunctive relief encourages the party in the best position to anticipate a 
dispute—the potential encroacher—to negotiate before using rights 
belonging to another.174 A potential user of another’s property right would be 
foolish to invest time or money in reliance on continued use of that right. The 
availability of injunctive relief gives the property owner leverage that would 
permit her to capture some of the value of the encroacher’s investment—
value the property owner would not capture in ex ante negotiations.175 By 
contrast, limiting a real property owner to money damages for intrusions on 
her rights would encourage potential encroachers to enter first and risk 
litigation later. So long as: (1) property owners were limited to money 
damages; and (2) fewer than one hundred percent of property owners would 
enforce their rights, potential encroachers would have an incentive to 
encroach rather than to negotiate for the rights they seek. 
Similarly, injunctive relief maximizes the property owner’s ability to 
coordinate use of her right, avoiding the overuse that characterizes the 
tragedy of the commons. By encouraging potential users to negotiate ex ante, 
 172. See, e.g., Hirshfield v. Schwartz, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); Wojahn v. 
Johnson, 297 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1980); contra Robertson v. Theriault, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
1624 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003); Walsh v. Johnston, 608 A.2d 776 (Me. 1992). 
 173. See Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986). But see DND Neffson Co. v. Galleria 
Partners, 745 P.2d 206 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). 
 174. See Merrill, supra note 53, at 38 n.88 (noting incentive effects of property rule in 
encroachment cases). See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1097 (1972) (arguing 
that in the absence of certainty about who can most cheaply avoid costs, “costs should be put on the 
party or activity which can with the lowest transaction costs act in the market to correct an error in 
entitlements by inducing the party who can avoid social costs most cheaply to do so. . . .”); see id. at 
1124–28 (noting that liability rules are only approximation of value of object to original owner, and 
suggesting that criminal laws against theft represents a kicker designed to deter future attempts to 
convert property rules into liability rules); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and 
Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 464–65 n.72 (1995) 
(detailing impact of liability rules on ex ante behavior). 
 175. Cf. Merrill, supra note 53, at 38 (noting potential for strategic bargaining after encroachment 
occurs).  
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injunctive relief enables the owner to avoid potential overuse that might not 
be appreciated by an encroacher, or by a court assessing money damages 
against an encroacher.176 
Because the primary benefit of injunctive relief is the incentive it creates 
for ex ante resolution of disputes,177 it should not be surprising that the few 
cases in which real property law does not award injunctive relief are those in 
which the potential encroacher could not have cheaply avoided conflict 
through ex ante negotiations. Pollution cases, which typically involve large 
numbers of parties, with consequent holdout or freerider problems, are the 
classic example.178 Courts have also limited the property owner to damage 
relief in cases where, often due to fuzzy boundaries, the encroacher is 
“innocent” in the sense that the encroacher does not realize that he or she is 
encroaching, and hence would not have considered negotiating in advance 
for the right to encroach.179 Often in these cases the landowner was in a 
position to avoid the conflict, but stood by and took no action.  
2. Copyright 
Although injunctive relief also remains the norm in copyright cases, 
doctrine reflects recognition that the fabric of copyright, with its concerns 
about stimulating creativity, requires careful consideration of demands for 
injunctive relief. The copyright statute provides a framework for that 
consideration; although the statute expressly authorizes injunctive relief, it 
does so in permissive rather than mandatory terms.180  
In the typical infringement case, where the infringer knowingly 
appropriates copyrighted work, adding little or no creative content, injunctive 
relief has become the ordinary remedy.181 In these cases, as in real property 
 176. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 77–78 (5th ed. 1998) 
(discussing difficulties associated with judicial assessments of harm to property owner). 
 177. Of course, injunctive relief also avoids the cost of judicial determination of damages suffered 
by a successful plaintiff. Id. at 78. 
 178. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). 
 179. See Sterk, supra note 36, at 81–83 (noting distinction in theory and case law between 
innocent and knowing encroachers). 
 180. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2000) provides: “Any court having jurisdiction of a civil action arising 
under this title may . . . grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable 
to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.” 
 181. See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(enjoining online use of video clip previews taken from Disney movies after infringer had negotiated 
license agreement that did not permit use of trailers and had been asked by Disney to remove trailers 
from its database); Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding injunction 
appropriate against infringer who videotaped TV news programs and sold news clips of relevant 
portions of broadcasts); Mattel, Inc. v. Robarb’s, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 4866, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11742 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (enjoining infringer’s use of registered flame design in toy car display when infringer 
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cases, there are no significant obstacles to negotiating for a license before 
using the copyrighted work.182 Creativity will not be stifled if copyists,183 
radio stations,184 or clipping services185 have to negotiate for the rights they 
use. As Judge Leval has observed, in language subsequently quoted by the 
Supreme Court,186 “In the vast majority of cases, [injunctive relief] is 
justified because most infringements are simple piracy.”187 Indeed, in many 
such cases, courts liberally award preliminary injunctions upon proof that the 
copyright holder is likely to succeed on the merits.188  
By contrast, in cases where the infringer has added value to the 
copyrighted work, a different picture emerges. In such cases, the Supreme 
Court has cautioned against routine award of injunctive relief. In Dun v. 
Lumbermen’s Credit Ass’n189—decided in 1908—the Court held that 
because the infringing material represented a small fraction of the infringer’s 
work, the court below had exercised its discretion wisely to refuse an 
injunction and remit the copyright holder to a court of law to prove 
damages.190 More recently, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,191 the 
 
 
acknowledged copying the design); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc. 991 F. Supp 543 (N.D. 
Tex. 1997) (enjoining operator of website from reproducing, displaying, and distributing images 
identical to those appearing in Playboy publications where infringement continued even after infringer 
was put on notice of infringement). 
 182. And, as one court has noted, denying injunctive relief would effectively make the copyright 
holder an involuntary licensor. See, e.g., Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 11 F. Supp. 
2d 329, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).  
 183. See, e.g., Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp., 25 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 184. See, e.g., Canopy Music, Inc. v. Harbor Cities Broad., Inc., 950 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Wis. 
1997). 
 185. See, e.g., Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490. 
 186. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994). 
 187. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1132 (1990). Judge 
Leval went on to explain: 
Successful fabric designs, fashion accessories, toys, and videos instantly spawn parasitic industries 
selling cheap copies. These infringers incur no development cost, no advertising expense, and 
little risk. They free-ride on the copyright owner’s publicity, undercut the market, and deprive the 
copyright owner of the rewards of his creation. Allowing this practice to flourish destroys the 
incentive to create and thus deprives the public of the benefits copyright was designed to secure. It 
is easy to justify enjoining such activity. 
Id. 
 188. In a much-quoted statement, the Third Circuit has indicated that when a copyright holder 
seeks a preliminary injunction, “a showing of a prima facie case of copyright infringement or 
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits raises a presumption of irreparable harm”—leading to 
award of a preliminary injunction. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 
1240, 1254 (3d Cir. 1983). For criticism of this development, particularly as an unwarranted intrusion 
on freedom of speech, see Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in 
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998). 
 189. 209 U.S. 20 (1908). 
 190. Id. at 23–24. 
 191. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
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Supreme Court wrote, in the context of parody, that the goals of copyright 
“are not always best served by automatically granting injunctive relief.”192 In 
each case, the infringing work reflected creativity by the infringer 
comparable to that of the copyright holder, and the fuzzy boundaries between 
idea and expression, or between infringement and fair use, would have 
created impediments to licensing negotiations. 
A number of courts have followed the Supreme Court’s lead, denying 
injunctive relief where an injunction would threaten publication of an 
infringer’s creative work.193 Sometimes, those courts, borrowing from 
principles established outside of copyright, have emphasized the 
extraordinary nature of injunctive relief. Thus, In Silverstein v. Penguin 
Putnam, Inc.,194 Silverstein, the editor of a 1996 volume of unpublished 
Dorothy Parker poems sought to enjoin Penguin from distributing copies of a 
three-volume 1999 work collecting all Dorothy Parker poems. Penguin’s 
work included all but one of the poems in Silverstein’s volume, 
chronologically arranged at the back. The district court granted summary 
judgment to Silverstein and issued an injunction, but the Second Circuit 
reversed, finding material questions of fact that precluded summary 
judgment, and also holding that even if Penguin had infringed, Silverstein’s 
right was “too slight to support an injunction against publication of the 
Penguin volume. . . .”195 The court cited non-copyright cases for the principle 
that injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy196 and went on to emphasize 
that issuing an injunction would reduce the value of the copyright in the 
poems themselves—a copyright not held by Silverstein, who claimed a 
copyright only in the arrangement of poems.197 Hence, even if Silverstein 
 192. Id. at 578 n.10. See also New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 493, 505 (2001), where the 
Court, after a finding of infringement by databases of newspaper article prepared by freelance authors, 
wrote that “it hardly follows from today’s decision that an injunction against the inclusion of these 
Articles in the Databases (much less all freelance articles in any databases) must issue.” 
 193. Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1988) provides a classic example. In denying 
an injunction preventing further exhibition of “Rear Window,” the Ninth Circuit wrote: 
The “Rear Window” film resulted from the collaborative efforts of many talented individuals 
other than Cornell Woolrich, the author of the underlying story. The success of the movie resulted 
in large part from factors completely unrelated to the underlying story, “It Had To Be Murder.” It 
would cause a great injustice for the owners of the film if the court enjoined them from further 
exhibition of the movie. An injunction would also effectively foreclose defendants from enjoying 
legitimate profits derived from exploitation of the “new matter” comprising the derivative 
work. . . . 
Id. at 1479. The Supreme Court affirmed without explicitly addressing the remedial issue. See Stewart 
v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990). 
 194. No. 03-7363, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 9006 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 195. Id. at *3. 
 196. Id. at *19. 
 197. Id. at *21. 
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proved at trial that Penguin’s work had infringed on his selection and 
arrangement, Silverstein would not have been entitled to injunctive relief. 
In other cases, courts have applied equitable doctrines like laches to 
prevent copyright holders from capturing the fruits of investments made by 
infringers. Again, a Second Circuit case is illustrative. In New Era 
Publications International v. Henry Holt and Co.,198 the court refused to 
enjoin a biography of L. Ron Hubbard even after concluding that the 
biography, which quoted extensively from Hubbard, infringed upon the 
copyright in Hubbard’s published and unpublished writings.199 The court 
invoked laches, emphasizing that the copyright holder’s delay in bringing the 
action prejudiced the biographer, who might have changed the book at 
minimal cost if the action had been brought earlier. Moreover, on the 
victorious defendant’s petition for rehearing en banc, all eight participating 
judges, in two separate opinions, made it clear that “injunction is not the 
automatic consequence of infringement and that equitable considerations 
always are germane to the determination of whether an injunction is 
appropriate.”200 
This doctrinal pattern—routine injunctive relief in cases of “simple 
piracy,” a balancing of equities, with frequent refusal to award injunctions, 
when the infringer introduces creative work—is consistent with the 
underlying justifications for copyright. Widespread availability of injunctive 
relief encourages potential infringers to negotiate in advance with copyright 
owners, enabling those owners to coordinate investment in the copyrighted 
work. But several factors make it more difficult for potential infringers to 
negotiate in advance with copyright holders, at least in those cases where the 
potential infringer expects to combine aspects of the copyrighted work with 
creative output of her own. And if ex ante negotiations between copyright 
holder and infringer are not feasible, the principal underpinning for injunctive 
relief disappears. 
For at least three reasons, the advantages generated by property rule 
protection of property rights in land, founded on the preference for ex ante 
 198. 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 199. The unflattering biography of the founder of the Church of Scientology was entitled “Bare-
Faced Messiah: The True Story of L. Ron Hubbard.” Id. at 577. 
 200. New Era Publ’ns Int’l, APS v. Henry Holt Co., 884 F.2d 659, 661 (1989) (en banc) (Miner, 
J., concurring) (concurring for himself and three other judges). See also id. at 664 (Newman, J., 
dissenting) (dissenting for himself and three other judges from denial of the rehearing en banc: “[T]he 
panel’s application of the laches doctrine demonstrates that equitable considerations, in this as in all 
fields of law, are pertinent to the appropriateness of injunctive relief. The public interest is always a 
relevant consideration for a court deciding whether to issue an injunction.”). 
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negotiations, is less significant with respect to copyright.201 First, information 
asymmetries often make it difficult for the copyright holder to coordinate 
licensing of the copyrighted work. A potential licensee may be reluctant to 
disclose the details of a prospective use until after securing the license; 
premature disclosure may cause the copyright holder to appropriate the 
unprotectable idea.202 On the other hand, the copyright holder may balk at 
granting a broad license without knowing the nature of the licensee’s use.203 
No comparable problems arise when land rights are at stake.204 
Second, copyright’s fuzzy boundaries (between idea and expression, or 
infringement and fair use), together with the difficulties inherent in proving 
infringement rather than independent creation, make bargaining over 
copyright licenses more difficult than bargaining over land rights, which tend 
to be clearly defined.205 Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, 
Ltd.206 furnishes an extreme example. A federal district court found as a fact 
that George Harrison’s “My Sweet Lord” subconsciously appropriated 
musical phrases and harmonies from an earlier song, “He’s So Fine.” If 
Harrison was not aware of the appropriation, how would he know—ahead of 
time—to negotiate with the copyright holder? The fuzzy boundary problem 
is not, however, limited to cases of subconscious appropriation. Even if a 
songwriter knows that he is drawing on an earlier work, doctrine provides no 
clear demarcation between appropriation of an unprotected idea and of 
protected expression.207 And even when an author appropriates protected 
 201. The copyright statute explicitly provides for compulsory licensing—a liability rule—for 
several categories of work. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000) (musical recordings); id. § 116 (songs 
played on jukeboxes); id. § 118 (use of certain works by public television). These provisions are 
designed, at least in part, to reduce the transaction costs associated with negotiating individual 
licenses. Terry Fisher has argued for an expansion of compulsory licenses to overcome transaction 
costs with respect to other low-valuing users. William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use 
Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661, 1724–25 (1988). But, as Robert Merges has argued, a statutory 
compulsory licensing scheme may deter private parties from developing privately administered 
liability rules, which tend to be superior to government-developed rules. Robert P. Merges, 
Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 
CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996). 
 202. See Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 83, at 1053.  
 203. Cf. Clarissa Long, Proprietary Rights and Why Initial Allocations Matter, 49 Emory L.J. 823, 
830 (2000) (discussing analogous problem in patent law). 
 204. When a neighbor seeks an easement, or a covenant, the neighbor can disclose his or her 
proposed use without concern that the landowner would appropriate the use; ownership of neighboring 
land will generally be a prerequisite to making use of the right at issue. 
 205. See generally Merrill, supra note 53, at 24 (noting that when entitlement determination costs 
are high, Coase theorem’s assumption of efficient bargains may not hold, because disparities in 
parties’ assessments of their respective rights often cannot be resolved without litigation). 
 206. 420 F. Supp. 177 (1976), aff’d sub nom. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 
F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 207. See Rehyer v. Children’s Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied 
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expression, that appropriation may be authorized by the multi-factored fair 
use doctrine.208 In these circumstances, knowledge that courts will award 
injunctive relief against infringers is unlikely to generate significantly more 
before-the-fact negotiations. Of course, uncertainties about the scope of legal 
rights are not unknown in real property law, but areas of significant 
uncertainty are the very areas in which courts most often limit owners to 
damage remedies rather than issuing injunctions that would require forfeiture 
of significant investments.209 
Third, because intellectual works often incorporate copyrightable 
contributions by multiple authors, a rule that allocates to each copyright 
holder a right to enjoin use of her work creates an anticommons—an 
environment in which multiple parties have the power to exclude each other 
from use of the work.210 Ex ante negotiations, then, would not necessarily 
produce value enhancing bargains. 
Once the preference for ex ante dispute resolution fades, the commitment 
to injunctive relief becomes problematic in light of copyright’s objective to 
generate optimal incentives to create. Because copyright’s boundaries are 
fuzzy, and because it is not always easy to separate independent creation 
from infringement, the prospect of injunctive relief may stifle creativity. 
Protecting copyrights with a property rule often allocates to the initial 
copyright holder bargaining power disproportionate to the value of her 
 
 
429 U.S. 980 (1976) stating: 
The difficult task in an infringement action is to distill the nonprotected idea from protected 
expression. . . . While the demarcation between idea and expression may not be susceptible to 
overly helpful generalization, it has been emphasized repeatedly that the essence of infringement 
lies in taking not a general theme but its particular expression through similarities of treatment, 
details, scenes, events and characterization. 
See also Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (1930) (Hand, J.), cert. denied 282 U.S. 902 
(1931) (noting that there is a point in a series of abstractions about a play “where they are no longer 
protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his ‘ideas,’ to which, apart from 
their expression, his property is never extended. Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and 
nobody ever can.”). 
 208. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (enumerating four fair use factors). Moreover, when the timing 
of a work is critical, as it often is when copyrighted work has significant news value, the likelihood of 
pre-publication negotiations is even smaller. Cf. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 
U.S. 539 (1985) (Nation magazine publishes excerpts from President Ford’s memoirs in an effort to 
“scoop” the competition; divided Supreme Court rejects the Nation’s effort to advance fair use as a 
defense). 
 209. See, e.g., Manillo v. Gorski, 255 A.2d 258 (N.J. 1969) (injunctive relief not available to 
remove minor, difficult-to-detect border encroachment where removal of encroachment would entail 
hardship); Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986) (injunctive relief not available for technical and 
unintentional misuse of easement when dominant owner would suffer hardship from grant of 
injunction). 
 210. Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 83, at 1020; see also Francisco Parisi & 
Catherine Sevcenko, Lessons from the Anticommons: The Economics of New York Times Co. v. 
Tasini, 90 KY. L.J. REV. 295 (2001). 
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creative output.211 Consider, for instance, George Harrison’s plight, or that of 
a movie producer whose film uses, as background, copyrighted paintings.212 
If the original author has a right to enjoin production or sale of the song or 
movie, despite a trivial contribution to the success of the work, the author’s 
bargaining power decreases the value of the song or film—reducing the 
incentive to create such songs or films.213 Although negotiations with the 
copyright owner before composing the song or making the movie would 
reduce the bargaining power of the original composer or artist,214 those 
negotiations are not always feasible—particularly in the case of the 
subconscious infringer.215 Moreover, given the abundance of themes, plots, 
characterizations, and musical figures, many authors are in danger of 
infringement actions by authors whose works they have never read or heard. 
If a successful infringement action would lead to injunctive relief, the effect 
on creative output might be significant.216 
These difficulties with injunctive relief do not apply in the case of simple 
piracy. There would be little reason to limit Disney to money damages in an 
action against an animator who drew a children’s cartoon starring Mickey 
Mouse, identified by name and appearance.217 But the case for injunctive 
 211. See generally 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 11.2.1, at 11:33 (2d ed. 2000) (“Armed with 
. . . an injunction, the copyright owner can extract not only the value of the infringing portion of 
defendant’s work, but also some part of the work’s value that is attributable to the defendant’s 
independent effort.”). 
 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990) provides a famous example. There, the holder of a 
copyright in Cornell Woolrich’s story demanded fifty percent of the gross revenues from Alfred 
Hitchcock’s “Rear Window”, which was based on the story. Id. at 228. The copyright holder had 
acquired the copyright for $650 plus ten percent of proceeds from exploitation of the story. Id. at 212. 
 212. See, e.g., Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997) (poster of 
copyrighted quilt used as background in television situation comedy). 
 213. See Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary 
Impluse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 259 (1992); Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent 
Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305, 307–08 (1992). 
 214. Cf. Gordon, supra note 213, at 259 (discussing effect of injunctive relief and various damage 
measures on the incentive for parties to use the market). 
 215. Even when those negotiations are feasible, Robert Merges has emphasized the possibility of 
strategic behavior and bargaining breakdown. Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and 
Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 82–83 (1994). 
 216. Mark Lemley has suggested another approach to this problem, a “blocking copyrights” 
doctrine similar to the well-established “blocking patents” doctrine. Lemley, Economics of 
Improvement, supra note 83, at 1076–77. As he points out, such a doctrine would prevent an original 
creator from capturing the work of a subsequent improver, because the subsequent improver would 
“own a copyright in her contributions.” Id. at 1077. 
 217. Terry Fisher has, however, offered another justification for liability rules in copyright. Fisher 
notes that compulsory licenses—a form of liability rule—can operate to reduce the deadweight loss 
associated with monopoly power. Fisher, supra note 201, at 1723–24. Fisher argues that if the 
licensing fee were set at a price less than the price the copyright holder would charge for the work, the 
work would circulate more widely. Id. This wider circulation would generate efficiency gains in light 
of the non-rivalrous nature of intellectual work. Id. Fisher concedes, however, that the copyright 
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relief in copyright infringement actions is more contextual than the case for 
injunctive relief in trespass or quiet title actions. Copyright doctrine 
generally—but not universally218—reflects that difference.  
D. Freedom to Contract: Conditional Transfers 
Free alienability of property rights has obvious advantages. When a 
potential buyer values a right more than the current owner, both parties are 
better off if the owner is free to transfer to the buyer. Moreover, a change in 
the identity of the owner does not typically generate externalities. Because 
owner and buyer are the only parties affected by the transfer, there is little 
reason for legal rules to prevent them from making a deal that benefits both 
of them. 
Suppose, however, that an owner wants not to transfer her rights in toto, 
but to carve up those rights, or to condition those rights on assumption of 
specified legal obligations. Should the law ever interfere? That question has 
long been a live one in real property law,219 and it has increasingly become a 
subject of debate in copyright law, where the primary question has been 
whether a copyright owner can impose contract conditions on potential users 
of the copyrighted work—conditions that limit the uses that copyright law 
would otherwise permit a licensee to make.220  
 
 
holder might have to be given additional rights to maintain the same incentive to create. Id. 
 218. Cf. Woods v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (granting 
preliminary injunction of movie that allegedly infringed on cartoon without inquiry into relative 
creative contributions of cartoon and movie). 
 219. The debate has proceeded among several lines. A basic question involves the scope of 
landowner’s freedom to impose constraints on purchasers or other successors. Although the common 
law has traditionally imposed a variety of such constraints, among them the Rule Against Perpetuities, 
the rule against restraints on alienation of fee interests, and the privity and touch and concern doctrines 
for real covenants, those restrictions on landowner freedom have also been under attack. See generally 
Epstein, supra note 157. 
 A second line of debate involves the mechanisms landowners use to impose constraints on 
purchasers and successors. After an era in which it had become fashionable to attack formal rules 
limiting the mechanisms for imposing restrictions, Tom Merrill and Henry Smith have studied and 
defended standardization of property forms as a mechanism for minimizing measurement costs borne 
by third parties. See Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 133; Thomas W. Merrill & 
Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001).  
 220. For a small sample of the debate, see Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private 
Ordering in Information Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063 (2000); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond 
Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111 (1999); 
Michael J. Madison, Legal Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1025 (1998); J. H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property 
Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 
875 (1999). 
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As with free alienability, analysis starts with the principle that parties 
should be free to carve up rights in a way that makes both parties better off. 
The next question, however, is whether conditioning rights in particular ways 
creates negative externalities that legal limits on free contract might control.  
First, consider the issues with respect to property rights in land. In 
general, a landowner can be counted upon to carve up rights in ways that do 
not generate overuse, because the owner will bear the cost of that overuse—
either in reduced productivity of the rights the landowner has retained, or in 
reduced sale price for those retained rights. Indeed, the tragedy of the 
commons justification for property rights is based on just this assumption: 
that an owner will coordinate use of the resource in a way that avoids 
overuse. Moreover, carving up rights in land among several owners does not 
generally have a significant impact on non-owners; whatever externalities the 
collective owners could impose would also have been within the power of a 
single owner to impose. 
Similarly, permitting a landowner to carve up rights does not generally 
increase the likelihood of physical conflict among potential users. As the 
ways in which an owner can divide up rights expand, so do the opportunities 
to satisfy the needs of diverse parties, reducing incentives for conflict.  
It should not be surprising, therefore, that the common law permits 
landowners to divide the bundle of sticks that constitute the fee simple 
absolute both by time (leaseholds, life estates) and use (easements, restrictive 
covenants, and defeasible fees). The parties may also provide, by private 
agreement, different mechanisms for assuring that the parties abide by the 
restrictions imposed on them. Thus, parties may provide for enforcement by 
injunction (as would ordinarily be the case with easements and restrictive 
covenants),221 or by forfeiture (as would be the case with leasehold violations 
or defeasible fees).222 
The few limits real property law places on freedom to divide rights in 
unusual ways reflect two potential externalities: search costs borne by all 
potential purchasers of rights in land, and harms inflicted on future owners 
whose interests might not be adequately reflected in current purchase prices. 
Consider first the search cost justification. Tom Merrill and Henry Smith 
have argued that the common law prohibits creation of novel property rights, 
and that the prohibition is rooted in concerns that novel rights would impose 
search costs not merely on parties to an individual property transaction, but 
on parties to all property transactions, including those that do not create novel 
 221. See Gerald Korngold, For Unifying Servitudes and Defeasible Fees: Property Law’s 
Functional Equivalents, 66 TEX. L. REV. 533, 548 (1988). 
 222. Id. at 548–52. 
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rights.223 At the same time, however, they concede that the limitation lacks 
substantive bite because “the system of estates in land is sufficiently flexible 
that one can nearly always find a way to effectuate a complicated 
conveyance.”224  
The principal limits on a landowner’s right to impose restrictions on use 
and future ownership of land are doctrines that reflect land’s permanency, 
together with the imperfections of human foresight.225 Owners who carve up 
interests in land today may not adequately appreciate the extent to which 
their actions will prevent land from flowing to higher valuing users in the 
future.226 One might expect that if restrictions will generate future 
inefficiency, that inefficiency would be reflected in the current market price 
of restricted land; but the more distant in time the inefficiency, the more 
negligible the impact on current price.227 As a result, the market might not 
provide adequate protection against long-term restrictions with the potential 
for inefficiency.228 
Consider, for instance, the imposition of restraints on alienation, a long-
time stepchild of the law. When a lease restrains a tenant’s right to sublet or 
assign the premises, courts typically enforce the restraint, largely on the 
premise that landlord and tenant are in the best position to evaluate the 
wisdom of the restraint.229 By contrast, when an owner imposes a restraint on 
alienation of a fee interest, common law courts routinely hold the restraint 
unenforceable.230  
 223. Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 133. 
 224. Id. at 24. 
 225. Merrill and Smith have argued that concerns about the external costs associated with novel 
property rights have led courts and legislatures to limit the types of property rights recognized by law. 
Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 133. At the same time, however, they recognize 
that “the system of estates in land is sufficiently flexible that one can nearly always find a way to 
effectuate a complicated conveyance.” Id. at 24. 
 226. See Ellickson, supra note 22, at 1374 (observing that excessive fragmentation of interests in 
land reflects incapacity to manage the land); Stewart E. Sterk, Foresight and the Law of Servitudes, 73 
CORNELL L. REV. 956, 957–60 (discussing doctrinal treatment of inadequate foresight). Cf. Julia D. 
Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future, 88 VA. L. REV. 739 (2002) 
(arguing that widespread statutory recognition of conservation easements fails to account for 
limitations in foresight with respect to technological advances and cultural changes). 
 227. Cf. Robert C. Ellickson, Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the 
Libertarian Model of Property Rights, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 723, 734–35 (1986). 
 228. See generally id.; Sterk, supra note 157, at 631–34. 
 229. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 15.2(2) (1986) (“A restraint on alienation 
without the consent of the landlord of a tenant’s interest in leased property is valid. . . .); see also id. 
cmt. a (noting that landlord’s concerns about personal selection of tenant justifies restraint on 
alienation of leasehold interest). 
 230. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 150, § 26.15. “The authorities are unanimous in 
holding that a perpetual and unqualified disabling restraint is void when imposed upon an otherwise 
absolute legal interest . . . An unqualified provision for forfeiture upon alienation is equally void.” Id. 
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The Rule Against Perpetuities reflects similar concerns.231 An owner is 
entitled to create contingent interests in the land, reflecting the view that the 
landowner is in the best position to evaluate the costs and benefits of those 
interests.232 But the Rule limits the time frame during which interests may 
remain contingent, reflecting doubts about the owner’s ability to foresee the 
relative benefits and costs into the distant future.233 In particular, an owner 
who attempts to create long-term contingent interests may well ignore first, 
the cost of locating the parties necessary to recreate a fee simple absolute, 
and second, the holdout problems inherent in obtaining their agreement to 
recreate that fee simple.234 The nineteenth century privity doctrine presents 
yet another example of a rule premised on inadequate long-term foresight. 
The doctrine prevented legal enforcement of covenants between neighboring 
landowners and appears to have been premised on fear that current 
landowners would ignore the difficulty that purchasers would face in 
discovering covenants created decades earlier.235 
These limits on freedom to shuffle the bundle of sticks, however, remain 
the exception rather than the rule, and they appear to be diminishing in 
 
 
See also Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 743 (1998) 
(“Under the common law, direct restraints on the power of alienation of a fee simple are strongly 
disfavored. But lesser property interests, such as leaseholds, can be made inalienable if the landlord 
expressly so provides in the lease.”). 
 231. Ellickson, supra note 22, at 1374. 
 232. See Jeffrey E. Stake, Darwin, Donations, and the Illusion of Dead Hand Control, 64 TUL. L. 
REV. 705, 717–18 (1990): 
The law leaves most decisions as to whether and how rights will be divided and subdivided to the 
individual holders of those rights. The rights to divide and transfer are important parts of our 
concept of private property. Because our property system recognizes finely divided rights in things 
and leaves decisions to subdivide to individual owners, a significant legal potential exists for a 
broad spreading of rights in assets. 
See also Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future, The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 
WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 705 (1986) (noting ability of owner to tailor terms of grant to mediate potential 
conflicts among subsequent grantees). 
 233. See generally JOEL C. DOBRIS, STEWART E. STERK & MELANIE B. LESLIE, ESTATES & 
TRUSTS 823 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that general idea behind the Rule is that “it is unreasonable for a 
decedent to attempt to control property beyond the period during which decedent might plausibly 
assert some special knowledge” of the property’s beneficiaries.). 
 234. The same concern underlies the common law antipathy to servitudes in gross—those whose 
benefit was not tied to ownership of neighboring land. See Korngold, supra note 221, at 543–44. 
 235. See Susan F. French, Toward A Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 
55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1292–93 (1982) (noting that in England, horizontal privity rule served to 
prevent enforcement of affirmative burdens not easily discoverable by successor landowners). 
Professors Merrill and Smith have taken the argument one step further, suggesting that creation of 
novel property rights imposes costs not only on land burdened by the novel rights, but also on 
prospective purchasers of other land. Creators of novel rights have no incentive to consider these costs 
on third parties. Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 133, at 27 (noting that parties 
who create new property rights will not take into account the full magnitude of measurement costs 
they impose on strangers to the title). 
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significance. The Rule Against Perpetuities has been abolished in many 
states and watered down in most others.236 The advent of recording systems, 
and concomitant reduction in search costs, has brought a decline (and even 
abandonment) of the privity doctrine.237 For the most part, the purposes for 
recognizing property rights in land—avoiding overexploitation, and 
minimizing conflict—are best advanced by permitting landowners great 
freedom to carve up interests as they see fit. 
Unlike land, works of authorship do not present a significant danger of 
overexploitation. Although law extends copyright protection to assure 
adequate incentives to create and develop intellectual works, law also 
recognizes that the market power enjoyed by many copyright holders will 
generate a deadweight loss. To minimize that loss, copyright law 
incorporates a variety of doctrines, including those discussed in previous 
sections: durational limits, fair use, and the first sale doctrine. Each of these 
doctrines increases dissemination of the copyrighted work and reduces the 
scope of the deadweight loss. The doctrines do so, in effect, by conferring 
external benefits on persons who are not parties to any intellectual property 
transactions: for instance, readers who do not pay for the right to read; 
subsequent creators who benefit from the fair use doctrine; or the principle 
that ideas are not entitled to protection. Seepage of copyrighted works from 
licensees to third parties operates to offset the monopoly power enjoyed by 
copyright owners, and to maintain an appropriate balance between prior and 
subsequent creators.238 
Permitting a creator to impose, by contract, non-standard conditions on 
use of a work of authorship permits that creator to eliminate many of the 
external benefits associated with the statutory copyright regime.239 For 
instance, by disclosing copyrighted work to potential purchasers only on 
 236. See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule Against 
Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097, 2101–03 (2003). 
 237. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.4 (2000), provides: “No privity 
relationship between the parties is necessary to create a servitude.” Comment a describes the decline of 
the privity doctrine, and comment b notes that the recording acts perform whatever functions the 
horizontal privity requirement previously performed. See id. 
 238. See Boyle, supra note 79, at 2032 (“When it comes to the price discrimination argument, 
however, the critics of intellectual property expansion will stress the way in which the current system 
is leaky enough to get the goods to many people at zero marginal cost.”); id. at 2033 (noting 
prevalence of leaky system, and general understanding that “accumulation of apparently useless 
information pays dividends in the long run.”); Gordon, supra note 86, at 1386–90. 
 239. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on 
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 433–34 (1999) (noting that background law 
use privileges may generate high positive externalities that would be lost if parties were free to 
contract out of background law principles); Julie E. Cohen, supra note 142, at 1812–13 (noting that 
centralization of access control will lead to underproduction of works that generate public benefit). 
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condition that the purchasers refrain from sharing ideas, or using even “fair 
use” materials, the creator of the copyrighted work can deny access to users 
who would otherwise receive the work for free. 
Ordinarily, propertization of resources is extolled for its ability to 
internalize externalities; if a property owner can capture all external benefits 
created by the resource, the owner is more likely to use the resource 
efficiently. When the resource is non-rival, however, complete propertization 
may result not in the capture of external benefits, but in their dissipation. The 
owner will typically charge a positive price for the resource even though the 
marginal cost of distributing another unit is zero, resulting in a deadweight 
loss. Avoiding this loss serves as a foundation for the doctrinal limitations on 
copyright protection—durational limits, fair use, and first sale among them. 
It is difficult to see what purpose is served by limiting the scope of copyright 
protection, only to permit the copyright holder to parlay those limited rights 
by contract, into a broader property right that avoids doctrinal limitations. Put 
another way, if one concludes that it is efficient to permit the copyright 
holder to eliminate positive externalities by contract, it is hard to see why it 
would not be equally efficient for copyright law to eliminate those 
externalities by statute—through abolition of first sale, fair use, and other 
limitations on property protection. 
Judge Easterbrook and others have argued that free contract enables the 
author to price discriminate, making the work more accessible to more users 
than would be the case if copyright law (or contract law) constrained the 
terms of license agreements.240 On this analysis, an author will not succeed in 
leveraging his market power to guarantee even more market power; more 
consumers will enjoy works of authorship in a regime that permits the author 
to set the terms and conditions of copyright licenses.241 
 240. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449–50 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, C.J.) 
(discussing increase in consumer surplus as a result of price discrimination and use of institution of 
contract to reduce opportunities for arbitrage, making price discrimination feasible); see also William 
W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1234–40 (1998); 
Randal C. Picker, From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the 
Propertization of Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 295 (2003) (“Microconsent, as it were, would 
make it possible to charge users small amounts for small uses, and we could march down the demand 
curve for a particular work. The dropping cost of consent means that we can more fully exploit—
through contract—the value of a particular work.”). 
 241. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449: 
If ProCD had to recover all of its costs and make a profit by charging a single price—that is, if it 
could not charge more to commercial users than to the general public—it would have to raise the 
price substantially above $150. The ensuing reduction in sales would harm consumers who value 
the information at, say $200. They get consumer surplus of $50 under the current arrangement but 
would cease to buy if the price rose substantially. 
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At bottom, the argument for free contract is an argument that the 
copyright statute itself provides too little incentive to produce works of 
authorship because the statute—unlike a regime of free contract combined 
with perfect price discrimination—does not permit the copyright holder to 
capture all of the value associated with her work of authorship. That 
argument, however, rests on a number of heroic assumptions. 
First, the free contract argument assumes that the value of a work of 
authorship is all value that is newly created, not value that is diverted from 
other works. Michael Meurer has demonstrated the falsity of that assumption; 
some of the demand for newly-created works of authorship is demand 
diverted from other works of authorship.242 Hence, if free contract permits 
the creator of a work of authorship to capture all of the value associated with 
the work, free contract will provide too large an incentive to create. 
Limitations on free contract, then, do not inevitably lead to inadequate 
incentives for creative activity.  
Second, the free contract argument assumes that perfect price 
discrimination leads to efficient distribution of copyrighted works. That 
assumption, too, rests on questionable foundations. Many potential 
consumers of a copyrighted work would pay nothing for it, because they lack 
sufficient information about the work’s value. If, however, they are able to 
use the work for free—as is often the case in a regime that recognizes 
doctrines like fair use, first sale, and the idea/expression distinction—they 
may ultimately derive significant value from the work.243 That value will be 
lost in a system of free contract, even if copyright holders are capable of 
perfect price discrimination. 
Third, even if copyright holders were entirely free to contract, they would 
find it impossible to engage in behavior approaching perfect price 
discrimination. Perfect price discrimination requires perfect information 
about the preferences of the universe of potential users. Even if we indulge in 
the questionable assumption that the users themselves know the value of 
intellectual works they have not yet consumed, copyright holders will find it 
quite costly to obtain that information. Especially if many users attach very 
small value to particular works, the cost of obtaining information about that 
 242. Meurer, supra note 110, at 96–97 (explaining how too much protection of works of 
authorship generate excessive incentives to create). 
 243. See Boyle, supra note 79, at 2033 (noting prevalence of leaky system, and general 
understanding that “accumulation of apparently useless information pays dividends in the long run.”); 
Gordon, supra note 86, at 1386–90. 
 Moreover, as Michael Meurer has observed, low valuing users, including research, religious, or 
educational users may create positive externalities which will be lost if they are excluded from access 
to works of authorship. Meurer, supra note 110, at 94. 
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value will typically exceed the value itself.244 As a result, these users will not 
enjoy the copyrighted work, despite the small marginal cost of providing it to 
them. And many of these are the very users who will enjoy the work for free 
in a regime where the copyright holder’s protection emanates from the statute 
rather than from contract.  
As price discrimination becomes increasingly imperfect, the argument for 
free contract becomes even less plausible. To the extent that free contract 
reduces the scope of fair use, first sale, and related doctrines, free contract 
excludes some potential users who would pay the marginal cost of 
distributing a copy of the copyrighted work, resulting in deadweight loss. 
The only benefit that offsets that loss is the incentive to produce more 
intellectual works that would result from the right to capture more of the 
value of those works. But, as we have seen, such a broad right may well lead 
to overproduction, rather than optimal production, of works of authorship.245  
The problems with permitting a copyright holder to contract freely with 
prospective users of the copyrighted work are directly related to the 
justification for providing limited property rights in intellectual work. We 
propertize intellectual work to provide an incentive to create; we limit 
property rights because the works are non-rival, and complete propertization 
would lead to underdistribution. Neither of these issues arises with respect to 
real property. 
The point, then, is that copyright’s foundation is sufficiently different 
from the foundation for property rights in land that the analysis is necessarily 
different. One cannot make a normatively persuasive argument for freedom 
to impose conditions on copyright licensees simply by analogizing to similar 
freedom in land law. 
CONCLUSION 
It is far too late to expunge the rhetoric of property from dialogue about 
copyright. Moreover, insights developed in the law of real property can 
sometimes illuminate knotty problems that arise with respect to intellectual 
works. The problem is not with comparison, but with superficial analogies 
that do not take account of the often different foundations and functions of 
legal doctrine in these two areas.  
 244. Cf. Meurer, supra note 110, at 75–80 (2001) (discussing sorting costs associated with various 
forms of price discrimination). 
 245. Meurer, supra note 110, at 96–97 (explaining how too much protection of works of 
authorship generate excessive incentives to create). 
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Close examination of the foundations of real property law and copyright 
law reveal differences, some subtle, some less so, that should and do have an 
impact on the shape of doctrine in each area. In particular, that examination 
cautions against importation into copyright law of several defining features 
of real property law—including permanency of rights, a broad right to 
exclude, nearly-routine enforcement of rights by injunctive relief, and 
unlimited contractual freedom to impose conditions on the exercise of 
statutory rights. 
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